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INTRODUCTION
Nearly twenty years ago prominent international jurist Louis Henkin 
wrote:
".... to many an observer, governments seem largely free to 
decide whether to agree to new law, whether to accept another 
nation's view of existing law, whether to comply with agreed 
law. International law, then, is voluntary and only
hortatory. It must always yield to national interest. Surely 
no nation will submit to law any questions involving its 
security or independence, even its power, prestige, 
influence." (How Nation's Behave 1968, p.26).
To the student of law this statement surely must mean that there
is no international legal order governing the behaviour of states.
To the student of legal philosophy it surely must give credibility
to what many international jurists regard as sacrilege to the profession
the so called "Austinian Handicap", which maintains that international
law is not law at all because laws "properly so-called" are in effect
commands emanating from a sovereign who receives habitual obedience 
but who, in turn, does not owe any such obedience to any person and, 
as such, international law does not qualify as law "properly so-called". 
On the other hand the European student of international law dismayed 
by the apparent futility of her study may find solace in other
approaches to the question of the existence, non existence or
applicability of international law. She may, for example, choose 
to accept the formulation proposed by Kelsen that there is an
international legal order based on threats of sanctions should a
state violate a norm of international law. Of course, faced with 
questions about the authority of the legal norms she so validates,
she may become bewildered by the fact that Kelsen proposes that 
authority is derived from some untraceable "higher" norm. Or, she 
may follow the teachings of Hersch Lautepacht who accepting the Austinian 
test maintains that:
(i)
"It is probable that the various shortcomings of international 
law, In relation to the constituent elements of the Austinian 
conception of law, are not necessarily destructive of the 
legal nature of international law so long as they are 
conceived as associated with a transient stage of immaturity 
which humanity, under the increasing impact of the inter-
pendence of the modern world, of the growing collective 
sense of morality and of the realization of the consequences 
inherent in the absence of an effective international legal 
order, is destined to overcome by conscious effort." 
(Collected Papers Vol. 1 p. 12).
Lauterpacht's sense of optimism about an international legal order, 
though appealing, is yet to be realised as the student will be aware 
of a growing sense of disunity in the world today.
The approaches towards international law are many and varied. What I 
have tried to demonstrate briefly above are just some of the numerous 
contentious points pertaining to questions about international law 
and an international legal order. This essay is not about the theory 
or philosophy of international law. It is not about whether interna­
tional law is law nor does it propose any definition of the same. 
Being a student of international law these questions I have encountered. 
I have been struck by the realism adopted toward the subject by Henkin, 
among others. I have been dismayed by the theorising and abstract 
reasoning of others such as Kelsen. However even the realism at
the end of the day tends to sound like an apologetic defence of the 
role international law has in relations between states. New approaches 
towards the subject end up as critisms with not. much to offer by 
way of new direction (for example see Tarullo or A. Carty). The 
increasing polarisation between various states of the first, second 
and third worlds does not seem to have much patience for such exercises. 
As a student of international law coming as I do from the third world 
and faced with the gross inequalities existing between the third
and first worlds the task seems not to engage in Eurocentric analysis
of international law but to tackle the questions arising out of this 
inequality. The basic realisation of international law is that it 
claims to function equally for all states, that is, . international 
law grants the same rights and imposes the same duties on all states. 
The question left open is whether the equal exercise of these rights 
and duties is possible under the present climate of international
(ii)
relations. Faced with questions of the applicability of pre-existing 
norms to new states, some international lawyers maintain that upon
entry into the international society there is some kind of automatic 
or superficial mechanism which renders these new states bound by 
pre-existing law. For example, Henkin readily accepts that the 
"reasons" new states accept international law are that they came
into an established system accepted by all nations;1 .acceptance 
into that society as an independent equal was proof and crown of 
their successful struggle", and ".... they adopted traditional forms 
in international trade and the growing co-operation for welfare of 
which they have been the principal beneficiaries...." (Henkin p.117). 
To the observer from the third world Henkin misses the very essentials 
of reality. Approaches towards questions of equality and benefit 
cannot be undertaken without an explanation of what status, what 
rights and what nature of relations these new states had as colonial 
entities and how these changed (if they did) during the transition 
from colony to "independent" state.
This essay is about a group of these new states and their relations 
with a regional power. It seeks to explore through a historical 
exposition the nature of these relations. It adopts as a basic tool
of analysis contemporary political-economic theory. It seeks to
destroy or explode the myth of the "sovereign equality" of states 
and show the effects of the ideological dimension (through historical 
progression) of the creation of states. It moves away from the legal 
conception of the sovereignty and equality of states. The thesis 
adopted is that relations between states are essentially determined 
not by legal concepts but by the political-economic climate.
There are three main reasons for undertaking such a study. The most 
paramount of these is to fulfill a theoretical deficiency in the 
core subject of the course - the international law of development. 
The second is to found an understanding of why rules and institutions 
created through the process of history are deemed legitimate and are 
acted upon as such. The third reason is that, coming from Swaziland, an 
exploration of the history of South Africa gives a better understanding 
of the reality of my country's problems visa vie South Africa.
(iii)
For the student of law, a venture into the study of international 
relations using political-economic theory as the basis of understanding 
is by no means an easy task. It is a venture not made in the least 
easier by the lack of a theoretical background necessary to grasp 
the variants of political-economic theory at the grassroots thus 
enabling the formation of the necessary tools of analysis to be applied 
to the study. Having studied the law of development, this essay 
is designed primarily to meet that other part of the course,development. 
A study of rules per se cannot give one the correct perspective of 
international relations and in particular development. Traditionally 
the issue of development has been undertaken by other disciplines 
and not the law. The result has been a study of international rules 
governing development without knowing why the rules have been shaped 
as they are today. This I feel warrants a look at other discipline 
- political-economy - which so much critises the foundations of 
international law as a dog without teeth. This is because critisms 
by political scientists can no longer be ignored, especially when 
a great number of international lawyers agree that international 
law has serious limitations in its role as a regulatory system.
There is no doubt that international law has contributed a great deal 
towards maintaining orderly procedures in trade and peace. However 
there is also no longer any doubt that it has failed in many respects 
too. The post-second world war era has seen rising dispair amongst 
the populations of the third world brought about by increasing poverty, 
famines, armed conflicts and unjust terms of trade. This prompts a 
fundamental change in the way international lawyers have perceived 
the foundations of international law. It is no longer wise to rely 
on circular "positivist" or "naturalist" arguments for the foundations 
of norms of international law. This essay proposes to look at the 
creation of rules through the historical dimension. It also seeks 
to show that any attempt to formulate new law cannot occur if this 
dimension is not taken into account. States behave as they do because 
of self-interest and not because of norms of international law. 
Therefore the belief expressed here is that in order to find the 
reasons behind regulatory procedures one must look to the material 
foundations as opposed to abstract notions. The ongoing debate about
(iv)
whether or not international law is law or whence international law
derives its authority is, in my view, a sterile one. On the
international fora rules are broken just as easily as they are made. 
They do exist and states do adhere to them when their interests are 
not at stake - for example the rules governing diplomatic immunity 
are generally observed. However, despite accounts to the contrary, 
rules themselves do account for much of the inequalities which exist 
between states. They account because they themselves have been founded 
upon an unequal international system. They will not change that 
system because it is the system which must change before the rules 
change.
Format
The format adopted in this essay is quite straightforward. The paper 
itself is divided into three parts. Part I attempts to tackle some 
of the theories pertaining to the issue of development. For this 
purpose an outline of orthodox Western development theory is examined. 
A critical look at this theory leads us to look at three prominent 
dependency theorists who begin from a different premise than that
of Western orthodoxy and reach a different conclusion. Lastly a 
modes of production approach is adopted. This overall approach has
been chosen because of the nature of the study. It gives a different 
perspective to international relations and emphasises the empirical 
necessity of studying such relations.
Part II is what may be said to be the essence of the essay. It traces 
the development of capitalism in South Africa. Through a historical 
survey it seeks to answer the "why" of the creation of the South
African state and the consequences of this historical process on 
the neighbouring states of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS). 
An attempt is also made to project the realities and reasons for
the creation of the BLS as nation states. Becuase of the vast nature 
of the content of history - beyond the scope of this paper - there 
is no attempt to cover everything. The reader may therefore feel 
a bit robbed as some pertinent aspects of history are left out. 
However, when viewed in context it may be noted that Part II is 
primarily concerned with the rise of South Africa as a hegemonic
power and the related impact of these historical events on the BLS
states. This leads us to look at the foundation of a legal institution
(v)
based upon a factual historical approach — the Customs Union Agreement 
between the BLS and South Africa (reproduced as appendices I and 
II).
I have termed Part III a conclusion to the paper. This so because 
it seeks to find the answers to the questions raised in Part II. It 
looks at the efforts of third world states to combat inequality betwen 
them and the developed world. A discussion of the New International 
Economic Order is undertaken alongside a look at the role of interna­
tional law in the process of change. The conclusions reached in 
this respect may be found to be controversial but they maintain the 
thesis of the essay. Part III also looks at the regional efforts 
of the Southern African states to combat South African hegemony. 
The emphasis of Part III is on applicability of the institutions 
rather than their content.
The sources used in the essay are both of a primary and secondary
nature. Limitations of time and availability of primary material 
hindered any attempt to focus on exclusively primary material. For 
Part I, I made considerable use of Randal and Theobald's Political 
Change and Underdevelopment both to introduce me to the subject and 
serve as a guide to the methodology used in political-economic theory. 
The historical survey adopted in Part II is undertaken with the use 
of mainly secondary materials as a study of history using primary 
documents would have meant considerable financial and time commitments, 
both of which are in scarcity. However in the whole essay I have 
tried to express in as lucid a manner as possible the opinions of 
various writers coupled with my own critisms and opinions.
The format adopted for references is based upon limiting footnotes. 
Minimum use has been made of footnotes with references to sources
being placed in brackets. A list of quoted material is provided 
at the back of the essay and is divided into the three parts of the
paper. For long quotations the standard is to sub-paragraph them and
for one sentence quotations to include them in the original paragraph. 
Authors and texts are indicated and where there is continuous use of the 
same text mention and page reference are given thereafter. The list 
provided at the back should suffice to indicate author and text if there 
is doubt.
(vi)
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PART I. IN SEARCH OF AN OPERATIONAL THEORY:
Dependency, Modernisation or Modes of Production
The purpose of this part of the paper is to try and identify a 
theoretical base on which to found a methodology which can clearly 
outline the internal and external political and economic relations 
of the states in the Southern African region. For this purpose the 
various political-economic theories pertaining to development, under­
development, dependency and the more recent "modes of production" 
approach, will be examined. It is not the purpose here to embark 
on a systematic in depth analysis of these theories. The aim rather, 
is to outline the themes of such theories and through a process of 
elimination reject those which prove futile to the study whilst accepting 
from others that which is applicable.
(i) Modernisation Theory and Economic Development Models
The proliferation of the newly independent states in the 1950’s and 
1960's warranted a broader perspective for analysing international 
political and economic relations than that which existed. The task 
of inclusion of the former colonies into political theory was initiated 
by Western (capitalist) social scientists. Their task was to formulate 
a theoretical basis upon which could be shaped the course of Western 
influence and policy. The result of this exercise is what is called 
"modernisation theory". Being based upon bold rations of the "march 
of progress", and containing a marked strain of evolutionary optimism, 
the underlying philosophy of the theory was that the former colonial 
states would, through the mediums of industrialisation and adoption 
of Western social concepts, move through a transitionary stage from 
traditionalism to modernity. Thus a model based on the Western 
industrialised state was drawn up to serve as the goal towards which 
the third world state must strive.
Traditionalism is identified as that stage in which society cannot 
expand production beyond a certain ceiling: these traditional societies 
are essentially agrarian with hierarchical social structures where 
family and clan connections play a central organising role allowing 
little scope for social mobility which is essential for high productivity.
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In order that they become "modern" these societies have to initiate 
a "take off" towards the goal of modernity. Rostow sees this initial 
take off as emanating from the ability of the traditional society 
to utilise modern scientific know-how. The grasp of modern scientific 
method is then translated by the society into industrial and agricultural 
production. The insight into modern science is provided by the intrusion 
of a more developed society into the traditional one. This intrusion 
in turn sets of a chain reaction whereby social and economic concepts 
of production are changed from the traditional static modes to become 
those of economic and social development.
This development is maintained in a period of "sustained growth" by 
increased investment into the economy. This investment process takes 
the form of re-investing a portion of national earnings. To maintain 
the growth of the economy consumption is suppressed in order to 
facilitate re-investment. After a certain period of time, on average 
about sixty years, Rostow maintains that the drive toward economic 
maturity is attained and the goal of mass consumption reached (Randall 
and Theobold. Political Change and Underdevelopment, p.19).
Alongside this framework of economic development runs the other strain 
of modernisation theory which seeks to complement it; that of political 
modernity. This focuses on the political framework in which economic
development is supposed to take place. Political modernity assumes
that there will emerge a political elite in the non-industrialised
state which will take upon itself the task of social mobilisation 
necessary to effect economic development. Faced with problems of 
state building, such as the need to create an efficient bureaucracy, 
this elite will draw, through a process of absorption (political
development), its ideas from the political model presented by the 
Western industrialised state. Through this process the political 
elite thus gradually terminates the existing traditional social 
structures and styles.
Modernisation theory, faced with the criticism that it has no realistic 
basis for assuming that the non-industrialised state would automatically 
follow the same path of political and economic development experienced 
by the industrialised states of the West, sought to justify its 
assumptions by reference to philosophical theory about the rational
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process of man (Moore pp. 7-17). The premise is that the individual, 
within a certain society and together with other members of that society, 
will rationally strive to maximise welfare and utility. This utiliterian 
theorising was thus in conformity with the desire to rationalise 
transitional processes and explain away the fundamental differences 
between the "modern contemporary" state and the "traditional" one.
By the late 1960's modernisation_ theory had come under increasing 
attack from all quarters of political theory and economic strategy 
reasoning. Not only was its abstract notion of nationality criticised 
(Moore pp. 15-17), but the most damming of the criticism was directed 
at the lack of realism about the sphere in which it was to operate. 
The idea of "staged" development leading to mass consumption could 
no longer be defended given the actual nature of relations between 
the "traditional" society and the industrialised state. The theory 
could not explain the acute dependence of the third world on the West; 
this dependence having been prompted by foreign investment and the 
transfer of technology. The political elite idea could not suffice 
to explain the gross social inequalities which were developing between 
the internal social strata of the third world state. Social mobilisation 
was being undertaken but only involved a tiny percentage of the 
population. Rostow's idea of re-investment of national earnings 
floundered upon the reality that most investment taking place was foreign 
and thus foreign controlled, with the goal, not being that of development, 
but of profits. It would seem that the failure of modernisation theory 
to grasp the implications of economic dependency is largely due to 
the initiation of a study of international political-economic relations 
based on the need of Western governments to found a legitimate base upon 
which to formulate strategy and policy.
Given this analytical deficiency of the modernisation theory and the 
value of Western scholarship towards formulating strategy and policy 
by governments, more sophisticated tools were employed. This took 
the form of what is called economic development strategy. Economists, 
conceding that underdevelopment was a symptom of international economic 
relations, and that dependency was the consequence of international 
trade, sought to solve the problem by employing Western economic theory 
to international economic relations. The two approaches employed 
were the neo-classical equilibrium model and the post-keynsian growth 
model (FROBEL, HEINDRICHS, KREYE and SUNKEL p.10).
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The main aim of these approaches was not to explain underdevelopment as 
such but to formulate strategies through which underdevelopment could be 
overcome. This, in effect would solve the problem of analysing the 
effects of foreign investment which the modernisation theory had not 
addressed itself to. For both models the starting point is to measure 
the growth of an economy using the Gross National Product (GNP) as 
the main global indicator. The GNP of as many countries as possible 
is taken and an ordered listing of these countries made with the 
countries having the highest GNP at the top of the scale and those 
with the lowest at the bottom. A dividing line is then drawn between 
the high GNP countries and the low GNP ones. Those with the high 
GNP are thus termed "developed" and those with the low GNP "developing".
The GNP variable is said to be independent and as such is a true indicator
of global incomes. The low income countries being low-productivity
states have to follow certain strategies of development in order 
to become high productivity societies. If these strategies are followed 
then the problems of underdevelopment will be overcome.
How then do you formulate such strategies? The starting point is 
not to analyse underdevelopment and its causes and effects but to 
maintain the GNP as the yardstick to measure "actual" development. 
The GNP variable when correlated to numerous other indicators, such
as the rate of investment, production, employment, literacy rates,
degree of urbanisation, number of patients to a doctor etc. is used
to interpret the state of the economy. This interpretation is then
used to determine the structural changes necessary to that economy.
The structural changes once identified, then outline the rate and 
type of investment needed, the educational and health policies to 
be adopted, and policy of the depth of agricultural mechanisation and rate 
of urbanisation. . This, therefore, represents what is called development 
strategy which when adopted pinpoints the path towards a mass-consumption 
society. (Frobel, Heindrichs, Kreye and Sunkel, pp.9-11).
Looked at this way, this model of economic development does not seem 
to offer much by the way of an alternative to modernisation theory. 
Its refusal to address the questions of dependency and underdevelopment 
underlines the almost heretic devotion which Western social scientists 
have with equating the growth of an economy alongside the same lines 
as Western economies. The strategy refuses to acknowledge that
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investment may be the main cause of underdevelopment. It refuses 
to acknowledge that the third world can never undergo the same historical 
experiences as those of Western economies. The use of the GNP as 
a global indicator is made with an almost sacred belief that it is 
truly an independent variable. Faced with questions of GNP per capita 
and its relationship to the prosperity of the majority of the population 
'economic- development strategists retreat to answers of internal 
distribution as if there were no ties between the internal social 
classes and the state of the world economy. The analytical poverty 
of Western (Capitalist) theories and strategies warrants their total 
rejection as a base for this paper.
However, because the modernisation and economic theories laid the 
foundations and sought to explain the policies and strategies of Western 
governments they must not be dismissed entirely. They help us to 
understand why the world economy is in the state it is in today. 
Structural changes, based upon policies of the expansion of the 
capitalist mode of production, did occur in the third world on a large 
scale. The alleged goal of these strategies was to reduce the gap 
in the standards of living between the industrialised Western states 
and the third world. However it soon became apparent that the supply 
of foreign capital, foreign expertise, foreign technology, foreign 
values, culture, ideology and weapons was not contributing to a rise 
in the standards of living of the majority of the population in the 
third world. The distribution of income had actually become more
unequal, social standards-nutrition, education, housing, health and 
social security - had not improved. These were the consequences of 
a transplant of capitalism from the first to the third world. They 
could no longer be explained away by notions of abstract economic 
development. It was thus the task of non-capitalist theorists,
philosophers and academics to undertake a systematic study of
international economic relations. The two main theories to come out
of this exercise were the Dependency theory and the Modes of Production 
analysis, - '
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(ii) Dependency Theory or World-Systerns Analysis to Modes of Production
The primary focus of dependency theory is on the international economic 
order. Its main premise is that no society can be looked at in isolation 
that is, isolation from the international economic order. Dependency 
theorists assert that the condition of underdevelopment is precisely 
the result of the incorporation of Third World economies into the 
world capitalist system which is dominated by the industrialised nations 
of the West.
In examining the nature and scope of dependency theory reference here 
shall not be made to the numerous variants, which have emerged in 
the last two decades. Reference shall be made to three prominent 
theorists in the field; Johan Galtung, Andre Gunder Frank, and Immanuel 
Wallerstein. An outline of the salient points of each of their 
perspectives shall be drawn. Johan Gultang's theoretical framework 
is discussed first. It will serve to introduce some of the terminology 
and also provide us with a model outline of method used in dependency 
theory.
Johan Gultang identifies the international economic order as one which 
is essentially imperialistic by nature. Imperialism is a relationship 
which is conditioned by the domination of one nation over another. 
For this purpose Galtung sees the world as being composed of two main 
parts: a dominant part which represents the developed nations and
a dependent part which is comprised of third world nations. The 
relationship between the two parts consists of the dominant nation 
establishing a bridgehead in the dependent nation.
The dominant nation is called the Centre and the dependent nation 
the Periphery. Both Centre and Periphery have their own centres and 
peripheries. The relationship between the two is one which involves 
a link between the Centre and the centre of the Periphery. There is 
a harmony of interests between the Centre and the centre of the Periphery. 
However, there can be observed a disharmony of interests between the 
centre of the Periphery and the periphery of the Periphery. There 
is also a disharmony of interest between the Centre and the periphery 
of the Periphery.
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The disharmony of interest, to which Galtung referes can been seen 
by measuring the "living conditions" in both the Centre and the Periphery 
and also between the centre and periphery in the Periphery. On the 
other hand, the harmony of interest which prevails between the Centre 
and the centre of the Periphery, does do because the living conditions 
are more or less the same. The living conditions can be measured 
by using indicators such as income, standards or living and quality 
of life. As long as there is continuity in the gap between the living 
conditions in the periphery of the Periphery and the Centre, there 
will remain constant disharmony of interest between the two.
Given this totally abstract notion of dependency one would be tempted 
to dismiss it out of hand. However Isaacs (from whom this outline 
is derived: Dependence Relations between BLS and the Rep. of South 
Africa, Chapters 1 and 2 ) points to two mechanisms, five types and
three phases of imperialism which Galtung explores in order to make 
his model seem less abstract.
The first mechanism employed is that of Vertical Interaction Relations. 
It assumes that there is a reciprocal relationship between the Centre 
nation and the Periphery. This relationship leaves the dominant 
nation in a far better position than the dependent nation. The relation­
ship is one which involves asymmetrical exchange. The clearest example 
of asymmetry is to be seen in trade where the Periphery exports primary 
products to the Centre. The Centre, enjoying an advanced level of 
processing capability, sells the primary product in the form of manufact­
urers back to the Periphery at inflated prices.
There is thus a processing gap which exists between the Centre and 
Periphery. This gap results in spin-off effects whose consequences 
are enormous and far-reaching. For the Centre they are generally 
positive, manifesting themselves on every level; economic, military 
politically and culturally. For the Periphery they are largely negative 
resulting in strengthened dependency on the Centre. These highly 
differential spin-off effects (to be discussed below) are the major 
source of inequality between Centre and Periphery.
The second mechanism is called the Feudal Interaction Structure.
This reinforces and maintains the Vertical Interaction Relations: 
in effect, it is the structure within which the VIR takes place
It assumes that because of the VIR there is no interaction between the 
Periphery and the Periphery, that is, between dependent nations. 
It also implies that there is no multilateral interaction between
the Centre and its Periphery with other Peripheries belonging to other 
Centres. What the Feudal Interaction Structure entails therefore, 
is a monopolisation by the Centre of any potential relationships the 
Periphery may have with other nations.
The consequences of the feudal relationship is that there is a
concentration of trade partners with the Periphery having most of
its trade with its Centre, and a concentration of commodities, with 
the Periphery having to export one or two primary products. The effect 
of these consequences is a relationship of economic dependency between 
the Centre and the Periphery. This economic dependence is a result 
of political strategy by the Centre which ensures that it is protected 
from the Periphery by means of the process of divide and rule.
The five types of imperialism outlined by Isaacs are economic, political, 
military, communication and cultural. The extent and nature of the 
relationship between the Centre and the Periphery will determine the 
types which occur and the degree to which they manifest themselves
as a whole of imperialism.
There are various inter-relationships which can be observed between
these types of imperialism. These inter-relationships manifest
themselves as sets of spin-offs and spill-overs. A spin-off effect 
would occur where for example the Centre exchange tractors for oil.
In this case it develops a tractor production capacity and one possible 
spin-off effect is a tank production capacity. This becomes a spill-over 
effect the moment that tank producing capacity is converted into military 
imperialism. More examples of spill-over effects may be where political 
imperialism is converted into economic imperialism by dictating terms 
of trade; communication imperialism to cultural imperialism through 
the regulation of the flow of information, cultural imperialism to
economic imperialism by means of technical assistance processes.
Where all the five types are operative at a given period ’'perfect" 
imperialism occurs. However should one or some of these types show
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signs of breaking up, especially the political and economic types, 
military imperialism can be activated to resume the status quo.
Galtung defines three phases of imperialism which occur in different 
periods of history: colonialism, neo-colonialism and neo-neo colonialism. 
Colonialism is the past period in which the centre in the Periphery 
was composed of people who came from the Centre to occupy and dominate 
the Periphery. Neo-colonialism is the present or contemporary phase. 
This phase is characterised by indirect control of the Periphery by 
the Centre through various international organisations. There are 
five types of such organisations which in turn represent the five 
types of imperialism; economic: private or governmental multinational
corporations; military: various systems of military alliances and
treaties and organisations; communication: shipping and air transport
companies and international press agencies; cultural: international
and non-governmental organisation; political: many of the international 
governmental organisations (Isaacs pp. 7-8).
The third phase represents the future. Here there is a more direct 
control of the Periphery by the Centre. With the sophistication of 
communication and transport systems, the centre of the Centre will 
be able to interact rapidly with the centre of the Periphery without 
having to exercise control via international organisations or without 
the need for physical occupation.
Even though Isaacs uses Galtung's theoretical model as the basis of 
his study of the Southern African periphery - centre relations, he does 
see the danger of using such a model to explain concrete situations. 
He notes that Galtung is highly a-historical in his approach. The 
model does not answer fundamental questions presented by history. 
In a very abstract manner it mentions three phases through which 
imperialism develops. These phases, as presented, seem to move 
automatically from one into the other. The model does not seek to 
answer questions as to how and why these phases occur.
However, in my view, the main problem with Galtung's model is the 
fact that there is a marked lack of an analytical framework defining 
the actual make-up of the operative groups in both Centre and Periphery. 
In other words, the model does not give us a specific role analysis 
of the groups and/or classes functioning within both Centre and Periphery.
One is left with the impression that it is sufficient that class 
analysis be based upon uncompromising units; units whose status within 
imperialist relations are to be seen in the measurement of "living 
conditions". The tests or indicators for the measurement of such
living conditions are themselves dubious at best. Without a clear 
definition of their respective roles in the Periphery, how is one 
to measure things such as income. For example it is a well known 
fact that within Periphery societies there are subsistence farmers 
who may constitute up to seventy percent of the population. These 
subsistence farmers are engaged to mass-self consumption and it may 
be an impossible task to measure their incomes, let alson their standards 
of living. In Southern Africa the issue of seasonal imigrant labour 
makes such a task even more daunting.
However, despite these faults, there is an appealing significance 
in the manner in which Galtung treats the imperialistic relationship 
between the Periphery and Centre. The significance lies in the mechan­
isms which he employs in order to explain the nature of the relationship. 
The approach, though a-historical, does present an intriguing and 
fresh view of the world. The spin-offs and spill-overs as consequences 
of Vertical Interaction Relations and the treatment of organisations 
as being conveyors of dependency relations in the contemporary period 
theoretically can be employed effectively.
One of the earliest pioneers of dependency theory is Andre Gundy 
Frank. He like Galtung adopts an analytical approach which divides 
the world into two main parts. He indentifies a world capitalist 
economy which he calls a "world metroplois". In this world metropolis 
we have a Centre (such as the United States and its governing class), 
which has its international satellites. These international satelites 
in turn play the role of national metropolises and are linked up 
to provincial satelites. The system works in such a way that there 
are economic links extending from the very centre of the capitalist 
system down to its furthest periphery. This whole system is "character­
ised" by close economic, political, social and cultural ties between 
each metropolis and its satelite", (Randall and Theobold p. 108).
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The sustaining factor of Frank's system is its monopolistic structure 
characterised by each metropolis exercising a monopoly over its satelite. 
This monopolistic structure involves what may be seen today as the 
appropriation of the surplus value of the satelite by its metropolis. 
Thus the appropriation of surplus value created by the dependent 
world is what, in effect, sustains the capitalist world economic system.
The world capitalist economy, Frank argues, is one which can only be 
explained through a historical approach. As he puts it, "if the 
essentials of past capitalist development are missed we cannot possibly 
understand the essence of contemporary and future historical development 
.... , it is absolutely essential to understand the present through 
the past, and to understand both the past and the present in terms 
of worldwide relations within the development of a single world economic 
system (Frank, Crisis and Transformation of Dependency in the World 
System, 1980 P* 187).
The development of capitalism, Frank argues, did not take place in 
isolation but was predicated on the progressive incorporation of the
various economies outside Europe. This incorporation due to European 
economic and political expansion since the fifteenth century, resulted 
in the now underdeveloped countries being drawn into a capitalist 
world economy and following a single stream of world history.
The crux of Frank's methodology is summarised by him in the following 
words;
"If we try to understand capitalism and the history of
capitalism as being based simply on Europe or Britain, 
and if we try to find a transition from feudalism into
industrial capitalism at the end of the 18th Century and 
then analyse its spread from one place to another, we 
are missing the very essentials of historical and 
contemporary capitalist development (Frank, Crisis and 
Transformation, p. i87).
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For Frank, the incorporation of the non-European nations into the 
world capitalist economy is essentially the reason why the Western 
world was able to develop. That is, the development of the West was 
made possible by the underdevelopment of the economies of Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America.-
According to him, this underdevelopment is, in turn, facilitated by 
the dependency links between the Metropolises and the satelites. 
Dependency links are created through the appropriation of surplus 
value by the metropolis. Appropriation is ensured by the maintenance 
of a steady international division of labour and an advanced 
technological base in the metropolis.
Even though Frank suggests a concrete look at world historical 
interaction in order to understand dependency relations, which is 
a move away from Galtung*s theory, one cannot help but note that he 
does not seek (as Galtung does) to engage questions relating to the 
role of the governments, bureaucracies and militaries; the organisations 
which would seem to be at the centre of any manifestation of a capitalist 
mode of production. However one must note that for Frank, change 
is on the international fora; one cannot engage in a study of change 
based upon internal capitalist development or the development of the 
state aparatus. For Frank there can be no independent or autonomous 
capitalist development in the satelites. This view serves to dismiss 
the traditional Marxist analytical model which suggests that with 
the autonomous development of capitalism the opposing classes will 
clash internally resulting in the overthrow of the dominant class. 
Even though Frank bases his model upon the Marxist notion of the theory 
of value he rejects the notion of class struggle as a basic tool of 
change. For him there is one world capitalist economy in which there 
is development in the metropolis and underdevelopment in the periphery. 
Autonomous development can only occur with the politicisation of the 
masses in the satelites (see Randall and Theobold pp.106-117).
Of critical value in Frank’s analytical approach is the use of history 
as the starting point to any understanding of underdevelopment. This 
is a theme which is picked up by Immanuel Wallerstein.
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For Wallerstein there is also one world system which has been such 
since the sixteenth century. His premises are similar to those of
Galtung and Frank; within the world capitalist system there is a core
and a periphery with a semi-periphery located in between the two 
(Wallerstein, The Modern World Capitalist System I chap. 7). In core 
economies are located advanced economic activites. such as industry, 
advanced technolgy, banking and the world financial markets. In 
periphery economies, economic activity is more or less restricted to 
the production of primary products.
Like Frank, Wallerstein makes the same point about the core's 
appropriation of social surplus produced by the periphery. Also like 
Frank, he attributes the creation of dependency relations to the 
international division of labour and advanced technological base. 
However, he sees these attributes as only being part cause. He 
introduces a new element into the theoretical framework by asserting 
that the inequality is underpinned by political power;
"This division (international division of labour) is not
merely functional but geographical. That is to say, the
range of economic tasks is not merely distributed throughout 
the world system. In part this is the consequence of 
ecological considerations to be sure. But for the most 
part, it is a function of the social organisation of work, 
one which magnifies and legitimises the ability of some groups 
within the system to exploit the labour of others, that is,
to receive a larger share of the surplus" (The Modern World
Capitalist System p. 349, my emphasis).
To ensure a perpetuation of this uneven distribution of economic tasks 
we therefore have, "the creation of a strong state machinery coupled 
with a national culture which serves both as a mechanism to protect
disparities that have arisen within the world system, and as an
ideological mask and justification for the maintenance of these 
disparities (p.349). The location of this mechanism is in both the 
core and the periphery and is also found in the semi-periphery which 
is politically independent of the core. In its strangest mode it exits in 
the core and only extends itself to the periphery in a weaker form and 
seeks to ensure that the wishes of the core are carried out. That is, 
the elite in the periphery are subserviant to the core as their relation­
ship with the core is collaborationist in nature.
1 ^
Wallerstein rejects the notion of the state as a vehicle for development 
and change. The attitude is reflected in his referal to the periphery 
as areas and not as states. This is so because "one characteristic 
of a peripheral area is that the indigenous state is weak.... one 
with a low degree of autonomy", (p.3490. he also sees no socialist 
systems in the world economy because, "it is a world economy and 
it is by definition capitalist" (Randall and Theobold p.124 quoting 
from Smith's Underdevelopment of Development Literature 1979). He 
regards socialist national economies as being actually "socialist 
movements controlling certain state machineries within the world 
economy." (Modern World System p. 351). This, in effect, means that 
a revolution to establish a socialist economy must take on an internat­
ional image, that is, must be acted out in the international forum 
rather than within the state.
This view of the state and its rejection as a vehicle for change 
and development signifies a marked generalisation of classes.Wallerstein's 
assertion is that, since it is a world economy, classes must be seen 
in the context of international classes. The formation of classes 
runs parallel with the development of capitalism. In order for a 
class to become one which is active, it must obtain a class consciousness. 
The only class which has maintained such a consciousness on a continuous 
basis is the international bourgeois. The bourgeois class is engaged 
in a class struggle with other international strata or groups within 
which the workers figure prominently whenever their class consciousness 
is activated. Thus the class struggle is one which involves a conflict 
situation between the bourgeois and other strata and which will be 
concluded on the international forum when workers having activated 
their class consciousness will overthrow the chains of wage labour 
(Modern World.System» pp 350-353).
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As has been seen, Wallerstein introduces the new element of political 
core power to dependency theory. However his devaluation of the 
state as a vehicle for change and development, and his purely 
international perspective to the study of classes and the class struggle, 
seems to this writer to undermine the importance of his world-system 
analysis of dependency relations. It is the contention here that 
any study the social and political forces existing on the international 
forum must be initiated within the state. It is also argued that 
even though an analysis of international classes is important one 
must look to the vehicles of imperialism - international organisations 
- to find answers for change.
The assumption of dependency theory or world system analysis that 
the capitalist mode of production has asserted itself in totality 
leaving no inch of the world untouched is accurate. How does dependency 
theory approach the problematic of allegedly still existing feudal 
relations of production within many states and regions of Asia and 
Africa. The obvious answer would be to deny their autonomy; that 
there are no truly feudal systems in existince, instead there is 
peasant production which is tied up in one way or another to the 
capitalist mode of production. It is, however, the denial of the 
development of a class struggle within the state capable of transforming 
the capitalist mode of production which must be questioned. This 
denial stems from the assertion - and this is especially true of 
Frank and Wallerstein - that in order for a socialist transformation 
to occur, there has to be autonomous development of capitalism within 
the state and that this is not possible given the structure of 
international dependency relations.
The denial of the state as a dynamic unit capable of political and 
economic development is wrong: empirical evidence suggests otherwise.
The October revolution of 1917 Russia did spearhead a transformation 
of the mode of production, that is, from a feudal-capitalist mode 
to a socialist mode. Marx himself asserted that once the means of 
production are taken away from private ownership and placed at the 
disposal of the workers the road to communism (distinguished from 
socialism) shall be opened. It would be fallacious to assert that the 
Soviet Union today is engaged in a capitalist mode of production 
as we understand it.
I have asserted above that the starting point of class analysis and 
class struggle must be within the state. A discussion of this point 
is warranted here. Socialist revolution today is a fact-situation 
in many third world states and the subject particularly relevant 
to a study of African political economy. It is seen by many Africans 
as the only way to break out of the yoke of neo-colonialism which 
grips the continent.
The starting point of our class analysis is with reference to Marxist 
tradition. The element of Marxist theory adopted is the historical 
materialism method.-
Marx asserted that in every society the most important human activities
are those by which men and women produce and distribute goods within
a society. The forces used to bring about such productive activities
are the level of production and the social relations of production.
These are the three key elements through which to determine the nature
of society. Depending upon the level of productive forces, the ways
in which the social, product is appropriated, and the relations of
production, there are to be found certain social classes. These
social classes are characterised by each class possessing opposed
relations to production. Appropriation of the social product by
one class produces contradictions within the social base giving rise
to a conflict situation between the classes (Cohen Class Analysis of 
African Politics, pp.87-88). ;
Classes evolve within society, and this evolution accompanies changes 
within the society. Change within society takes place when increased 
levels of production make possible new productive relations which 
in turn make possible increased levels of production, resulting in
a cyclical evolutionary process. This process is characterised by
eras or stages of social change which increasingly produce a "bipolar
model" of classes within the society (see Cohen p.88).
However this bipolar model is not always true. It is particularly
applicable in the era of capitalism but may not apply to traditional 
communal societies. Classes it should be noted, at any stage or
epoch of social evolution; possess an internal differentiation whereby
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they can be divided into various fractions, strata or categories. 
The fractions, strata or categories of one class may possess conflicting 
interests amongst themselves but one united vis a vis opposing classes.
The different and opposed interests of conflicting classes within 
the changing process of production outlines the nature of the class 
struggle. This class struggle is the human arena within which are 
played out the basic contradictions arising from the nature of 
production (Cohen p.88).
All social change is therefore determined by the manner in which 
this class struggle manifests itself. In his letter to Bloch (21.9.1890) 
Engels puts it this way:
"According to the materialist conception of history, 
the ultimately determining factor in history is the 
production and reproduction of real life. Neither Marx 
nor I have ever asserted more than this. Hence if somebody 
twists this into saying that the economic factor is the 
only determining one, he transforms that proposition 
into a meaningless, abstract, absurd phrase. The economic 
situation is the basis, but the various elements of the 
superstructure - political forms of the class struggle 
and its results, such as constitutions established by 
the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., 
juridical forms, and especially the reflections of all 
these real struggles in the brains of the participants, 
political, legal, philosophical theories, religious views 
and their further development into systems of dogmas 
- also exercised their influence upon the course of the 
historical struggles and in many cases determine their 
form in particular. There is an interaction of all these 
elements in which amid all the endless host of accidents, 
the economic movement is finally bound to assert itself. 
Otherwise the application of the theory to any period 
of history would be easier than the first degree". 
(Reproduced in Cain and Hunt, Marx and Engels on Law 
1979 at p.56 and Cohen p.88) f
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Thus the relations between the classes are those of domination and 
and exploitation. The stronger class uses its control over production 
relations to exploit the weaker class. As Engels1 letter reflects, 
it is the ideology of the ruling class compounded by the control 
of the economic base which sets the scene for domination and 
exploitation. The ideology of the ruling class is used to justify, 
explain and reinforce its rule.
The state is the instrument the ruling class uses as its tool of 
domination. Through the state apparatus it reinforces the ideological 
base and manages its interests. The ruling class, even though it 
has its own fractions or strata with conflicting interests, presents 
itself as a unified or allied force in the face of confrontation 
with the dominated classes.
The present era of social evolution is characterised by the capitalist 
mode of production. This mode is dominant over older feudal modes. 
Within this capitalist mode of production, production is characterised 
by conditions in which the means of production are privately owned. 
This ownership is, "not only a legal category but above all an economic 
one. It means that the power to dispose of the productive forces 
does not belong to the collectivity but is fragmented between the 
different groups of the capitalist class." (Ernest Mandel, From 
Capitalism to Communism, 1977 at p.48).
The basic feature of a capitalist mode of production is the approp­
riation of surplus value for purposes of accumulation. Where wealth 
is accessible it is used by the capitalist class to facilitate the 
development of capitalism through appropriation and accumulation. 
On a world scale accumulation results in a surplus of capital which 
is in one way or another controlled by huge industrial concerns which 
control the monopolised markets of the world. The surplus of capital 
accumulated by the industrial nations gives rise to a vast movement 
to export capital to the underdeveloped countries. This in turn 
facilitates the domination of dependent countries by foreign capital 
(or imperialist capital).
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Therefore, in the underdeveloped state, the dominant force is that 
of imperialist capital. The social classes inherent within the 
underdeveloped state are therefore not of the same composition as 
those in the industrialised world.
In examining African class relations it is important to realise that 
production is geared to the needs of international capital through 
international markets for export production. The international 
capitalist class which owns and controls most of the productive forces 
in African economies organises its domination and exploitation of 
African producers through,
"A variety of institutional arrangements: in the economic
sphere, multinational corporations, international banking 
houses and international markets" (Dennis Cohen, p.95).
The international .bourgeois' dominance in production is therefore the 
first main characteristic of the capitalist class in Africa. On the 
international forum this international bourgeois is independent, 
manifesting itself in the form of the multinational corporation and 
responding to investment opportunities on a world scale. Through 
an international infrastructure comprised mainly of the multinational 
corporations - including financial banks - the international bourgeois 
makes decisions about the location of production independently of 
geographical factors.
The strength of the international bourgeois to control production 
irrespective of international bodies has serious consequences for 
the social base of the African state. The most important function 
of the state in the metropolis is the protection and securing of 
international capitalist relations of production. However for the 
dependent African state its function, above all, is to provide a
cheap labour force and inputs and services to industries they don't
control. According to our Marxist analysis of classes it is the
dominant or ruling class which controls the state apparatus: thus
the state serves the interests of the international bourgeois to 
the extent that this class is dominant. In order to ensure the 
servitude of the state the international bourgeois does not itself
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exercise direct control. Such control is exercised by the local 
capitalist groups. Because of the lack of control over the means 
of production the local capitalist class is not comprised of a national 
bourgeois. Power over the state is exercised by the petty bourgeois, 
entrepreneurs and servants of capital - which they control. This 
latter group is composed of professionals, such as lawyers, doctors, 
etc., managers, administrators and army officers.
Despite claims that the petty bourgeois has conflicting interests 
vis a vis the international bourgeois - i.e., their aim is to control 
the means of production - they have largely maintained a collaborationist 
relationship with the international capital. Frobel, Heindricks, 
Kreye and Sunkel go to the extent of claiming that this class is 
tending to become fully dependent on internationalisation of capital 
(The Internationalisation of Capital and Labour, 1981 p.19). I support 
this argument. The nature of dependency relations cannot allow for 
the radicalisation Qf the local bourgeois or for the autonomous 
development of capitalism which would allow for the emergence of 
a national bourgeois.
Thus the question posed by the dependericias remains, in the face of 
the lack of autonomous capitalist development how can socialist change 
be effected? Marxists have referred this question to the role of 
antagonist classes within this capitalist set-up. In fact Marxism 
views the proletariat class as the key to revolution. The question 
therefore is, does Africa possess a proleteriat capable of effecting 
general change. Or to put it another way, has the phase of worldwide 
production created an industrial labour force whose sole asset is 
their labour sold for a wage.
When applied to Africa these questions pose some difficulty. There 
are essentially two main schools of thought on the subject. The 
first ("Labour Aristocracy Thesis") maintains that even though the 
injection of capital has resulted in jobs, workers in Africa "do not 
constitute a permanent, urbanised, proleterian class, but an armophous 
collection of migrant workers still tied to the land". What urban 
workers there are, are a highly paid "labour aristocracy attuned 
to political conservatism." (Cohen p.99).
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The second school maintains that empirical evidence does point to 
the existence of a numerically significant and politically capable 
proleteriat, whose existence has been conditioned by systematic use 
of cheap labour,. (Cohen pp. 98—100)
The problems I find with the labour aristocracy thesis is that it
discounts the fact that colonialism eradicated most of the communal 
systems ensuring rights in rural land. Alienation of the peasants 
from the land has actually resulted in the rural masses assuming 
as their dominant relation to production their capacity to sell labour 
as migrants. This may not have formally proleteriatised them, but 
the fact that selling their labour has become the only means of family 
survival with subsistence farming further becoming a sideline, means 
greater insecurity and therefore greater revolutionary potential.
The labour aristocracy thesis draws a distinction between the urban 
and rural worker. The claim is that in fact the workers in the urban 
sector enjoy a high standard of living and thus cannot be seen as
a revolutionary class. Despite the lack of empirical
evidence to this claim one must point to the hypocrisy of sharply 
differentiating between urban and rural workers but not drawing a 
distinction between the various strata within the urban proleteriat.
It is my contention that there is an African proleteriat capable of 
organising social change. While the labour aristocracy theory contains 
some truth in that there is a category of workers whose conservatism 
is produced by high wages, this strata is small and as such cannot
cast doubt upon the efficacy of the proleteriat as a political force
in Africa, capable of social change.
However, this assertion must be treated with cautionary reference to 
the problems posed by the process of capitalistic development. Many 
difficulties are faced by those who seek to organise the labour force. 
The main difficulties are posed by the state as a functional tool 
of the international bourgeois and the collaborationist petty bourgeois. 
The function of the state has already been discussed above. However, 
with reference to the organisation of labour a few observations may 
be made.
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First the state ensures the existence of a large, albeit. not
inexhaustible reserve army of workers. Secondly in many countries 
it has outlawed or repressed the right of workers to strike or form 
effective trade unions. Thirdly the promotion of higher wage earnings 
for a small strata of the working class can possibly drive a split 
within proleterian ranks.
To counter these problems the workers must engage progressive factions 
within the petty bourgeois - especially those with whom they have
close contact; the progressive lawyers, doctors and other elements 
in the professional strata which are dissatisfied with their role 
as servants of international capital. Contact with workers from
developed countries through international organisations is essential 
to bring pressure to bear on the state: internationalisation of the 
class struggle through organisations such as the International Labour 
Organisation can only bear positive results.
Conclusion
In this part of the essay I have looked, albeit briefly, at the various 
theoretical foundations for the study of the structure of politico- 
economic relations between the industrialised states and the under­
developed world. The search for a model which will suit a situational 
study of dependency relations in Southern Africa has been met with
an exposition of the salient, points of the theoretical models. An 
out line of the irrelevant and relevant points of each model has 
been given.
Starting with the modernisation model to the study of the development 
process, I rejected in entirety the theoretical approach adopted 
by this model for its failure to grasp the implications of the under­
developed world's chronic economic dependence on the West. However 
an exposition of the theory helps us to understand the reality of 
Western exported development strategies which have contributed to 
the immiserisation of the populations of third world countries.
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Galtung's theory of imperialism gives us a new perspective from which 
to look at the issue of dependency. His approach to the study of 
the role of organisations is valuable to the understanding of the 
impact international institutions have had on the third world. It is 
true that modern society is characterised by organisations and 
organisational networks; that social interaction between people takes 
place within an organisational framework. For a change to occur 
in society, the organisation as a vehicle of change cannot be ignored 
since it is largely through organisations that the West maintains 
its superior economic and political position. Change can only occur 
by means of guided social action and the organisation must be at 
the forefront of any such social action. That is, in order to counter 
organised power use must be made of organised power.
’Frank and Wallerstein introduce us to the historiology of dependency 
theory, providing an analytical approach to the study of the dynamism 
of capitalist development. They provide us with a framework within 
which to study the evolution of capitalist interaction with the third 
world. However, there is lacking a precise class analysis to help us 
understand how revolutionary change can occur and break down the 
chains of dependency. This is provided by a Marxist analysis of 
classes alongside a mode of production analysis.
The modes of production analysis shall be employed here as the basic 
structure used in Part II of the paper. This is so because this 
writer feels after having examined other theories that it is the 
best approach towards an understanding of both international and 
internal relations of the capitalist system. Part II of the paper 
will therefore seek to trace, as briefly and as clearly as possible, 
the development of a capitalist mode of production from contact 
with the Europeans up to the contemporary period, and the creation and 
maintenance of dependency relations between the BLS countries and 
South Africa - such dependency emanating from the transformation 
of the social production process.
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PART II. ... THE GROWTH OF 'SOUTH AFRICAN CAPITALISM AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF DEPENDENCE RELATIONS WITH BOTSWANA, LESOTHO 
AND SWAZILAND
The history -of South. Africa, since contact with Europeans, reveals 
like most of Africa, a systematic domination aimed at repression 
and subjugation for political and economic gain. However, unlike 
the rest of the continent, European domination in Southern vAfrica was 
more intense and complex; the Europeans had come to settle.
(i) CONTACT WITH THE EUROPEANS AND THE EXPANSION 
OF A CAPITALIST MODE OF PRODUCTION
Commercialism and the Settler Communities
Contact between Africans and Europeans on the sub-continent began 
with the establishment of a lucrative trade route around the Cape 
of Good Hope to India and China. In 1653 the Amsterdam based Dutch 
East India Company established a half-way station in what is now 
known as Cape Town. This was to provide fresh supplies - meat and 
vegetables - to the sea-going European vessels passing on their way 
to India and the East Indies.
The essential purpose for establishing the ' station was initially, 
not to provide a base for European expansion into the interior of 
Southern Africa. The venture was carried out by a trading company 
whose interest was solely to provide supplies and resting facilities 
for its profitable trade. However, this later required the use of 
land to grow vegetables and sustain herds. For this purpose land was 
taken by force from the Khoi tribes inhabiting the Cape Penninsula.
The Khoi had,' prior to settlement of Europeans, been largely engaged 
in pastoral activity with limited agricultural production in the 
Western Cape. Their contact with Europeans had largely been to barter 
fresh meat and vegetables in exchange for iron implements with ships 
passing by. The settlement in the Cape saw their dispersion from 
the Western Cape as they were relentlessly driven further inland 
by the settlers.
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The impact of Khoi displacement is what distinguished, at this period, 
European influence upon Southern Africa from almost all other African 
colonial situations. Elsewhere in Africa, the colonialists were 
usually faced with the problem of reshaping communal societies into 
capitalist ones geared to suit the needs of a capitalist mode of production 
situated at the metropolis. The Cape saw the establishment of a 
totally new society which replaced the pre-existing mode of production 
and also replaced the indigenous community.
What was established at the Cape was a capitalist mode of production 
whose essential feature was private ownership of the means of 
production. Denoon and Nyeko, asserting that capitalist and commercial 
relationships were established immediately the settlement was located 
put it thus:
"the immigrant community contained within itself only 
three kinds of people; company officials governing 
the whole community, then ihe owners of productive property 
(land, cattle, sometimes slaves), and finally those who 
performed labour for the owners of property (either
as slaves or as wage labourers)." (Southern Africa Since 
1800, 1984, p.19).
Thus prior to the nineteenth century European settlement in the 
Cape was initiated by the requirement of a successful merchant
capitalist company and not by a European state. This occupation, 
requiring a great deal of capital and manpower and the imposition of 
commercial production for the market, was to unleash formidable forces 
which would serve to transform the whole region.
In Cape Town itself and in the surrounding districts, capitalism 
manifested itself in a rather rudementary form. The Dutch East
India Company took over the ownership of land wrested from the Khoi. Due 
to commercial and administrative problems the company found itself 
unable to conduct agricultural and pastorial production. The strategy 
employed was to release company employees (called freeburghers), grant 
them rights to land and oblige them to sell their products to the
company. In this way the company maintained its monopoly over the
market for pastoral and agricultural products.
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Labour was provided mainly by slave labour imported from other African 
communities in Angola, West Africa and Madagascar. Individual Khois, 
who had become alienated from the land were also used as labour. The 
rest of the labour force was made of up immigrants paid a wage.
With more settlers arriving at the Cape towards the end of the 
eighteenth century, expansion of commercial pastorialism speeded up 
with a new dynamism. No longer was pastoral production centred 
around the freeburgher. A new breed of settler called the trekboer 
began moving into the Eastern hinterland. The activity of the trekboer 
was to occupy lands in the interior, moving whenever grazing fields 
became exhausted. They were tied to Cape Town through the sale 
of their herds to the company in exchange for supplies to maintain 
them for long periods in the interior.
The rapid expansion was not met with only passive resistance by the 
local inhabitants. The Khoi communities which had resettled in 
large numbers in the North East offered armed resistance, raiding 
trekboer settlements and reclaiming cattle and sheep. To the East 
the trekboers also met fierce resistance from the Xhosa and to the 
West the San. The scope of this paper does not allow for a systematic 
analysis of African resistance to settler expansion. However, it 
must be mentioned that the further North the Europeans moved the 
more resistance they met. The trekboer was not given to peaceful 
negotiation over the issue of land and the various indigenous groups 
within the interior - the Zulus, BaSotho, BaVenda and the San - 
having learnt from the bitter experiences of the Khoi, were not 
willing to accommodate the aspirations of the trekboer and bitterly 
fought back.
When the British government took over the Cape in 1806 after the 
collapse of the Dutch East India Company in Europe (due to the European 
wars) they abolished slavery. The structure of Cape society, however, 
remained the same with the affluent citizens of Cape Town still 
living on the production of the uneducated and backward farmers and 
pastorialists in the interior. What is most significant about the 
European inhabitants of the interior was their religion. They
described themselves as Christian and used the bible as a source of 
literacy. This did enable them to register claims to lands they
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occupied. However, of more significance was their use of the Christian 
religion to justify the misconception of the superiority of the 
white race over all others. This attitude was derived essentially 
from a perversion of the Calvinist teachings of Christianity at 
the time and further justified by Lutheranism. Thabo Mbeki puts 
it succintly:
"From Calvanism the Boer took the doctrine of predestination 
and perverted it. For Calvin, the chosen of God were 
those who survived the jungle of capitalist enterprise 
in industry and trade and emerged as successful men of 
business, without regard to race or nationality. In 
the patriarchal economy this was transmuted to read: 
the chosen of God are those who are white. For his 
part Luther said: 'An earthly kingdom cannot exist without
inequality of persons: some must be free, others serfs,
some rulers, others subjects.'" (South Africa "The 
Historical Injustice" in Conflict and Change in Southern 
Africa, ed. Chap. 5, p.136, 1978).
This was an attempt to rationalise, justify and make acceptable 
the enslavement and exploitation of the black people by the white. 
As a pyschologically demented fixation of the Boers this racist 
ideology was to be imprinted on the whole history of Southern Africa 
beginning with this period of expansionism initiated by the trekboer.
The trekboer, with only his herds for a livelihood and hungry for 
new pastures had to contend with raids from the San and counter-attacks 
from the Xhosa at the turn of the century. There was no adequate 
protection for them from the Cape government. To counter-attack they 
often formed commandos amongst themselves and elected their own 
leaders - they could no longer rely on the British who infuriated 
them with their peace efforts. These unofficial efforts at self- 
government marked a significant period in the attitude of the trekboer 
- who was to become known as the Afrikaner. As the trekboer began to 
move beyond the colonial boundries of the Cape they formalised their 
previous efforts at self government. The commandos were militarised 
with all the men in the community forming themselves into groups, 
sharing a common military purpose. A leader was elected to represent 
them at community level.
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By 1836 these groups, faced with the stalwart resistance of the 
Xhosa to the East and the colonial policy of the British, began 
moving North-Westwards in what came to ' be known as the "great 
trek". This "great trek" was not so much a big concentrated movement 
of people but rather the movement of distinct groups in search of 
new pastures further north. They shared the common goal of searching 
for land and acted in concert by uprooting settled local communities 
and chasing them further north or into the mountainous regions of 
the Orange Free State. However what they did not share as a community 
was the same political aspirations. Some groups saw the trek as 
an extension of colonial rule from the Coast to the interior, others 
wanted complete independence from the British.
Despite aspirations for self-government on the political front, 
commercially the trekboer was still tied to the colonial community 
of Cape Town (and later Port Elizabeth and Port Natal). These were 
the only outlets of the sea and they were controlled by the colonialists. 
Furthermore, because of the nature of pastorialism the trekboers 
were often small nomadic groups and thus could not consolidate enough 
power to counter colonial annexation of the new lands. Taken together 
these factors serve to show that the boers were not masters of their 
own destiny or autonomous societies. They exercised commercial 
pastorialism where prevously subsistent pastorialism had been the 
norm. However, this commercialism was being exercised in the interests 
of capitalism in the Cape.
The British annexation of the Cape as a Crown colony in 1806 saw 
the expansion of colonial frontiers. Many battles for control were 
fought between British regiments and indigenous groups. The British, 
being masters at the art of occupation, saw that the military strategy 
was not enough to stabilise the frontiers. They had to employ 
political and social strategies to maintain reasonable stability.
The main strategy adopted was to try and settle indigenous communities 
on annexed lands hoping that they would build up stable communities 
based on agricultural production. This policy proved a failure in one 
sense because these lands were still involved in hot dispute with both 
Europeans and Africans claiming them. On the other hand, they reveal 
the beginning of a well defined attitude to property rights.
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Again, colonial rule brought with it a different attitude to the 
labour policy existing in the Cape. I n '1806 Britain outlawed the 
slave trade throughout the empire. By 1834 when slave labour was 
finally abolished the emphasis was on a disciplined labour force 
working for a wage.
Social Transformation and the Mineral Revolution
So far we have been considering the expansion of the new society from
Cape Town into the interior. African societies were drawn into 
certain market relationships with the Europeans which had a profound 
effect on the social base. Most of the frontier communities which 
came into contact with the trekboers were dispossessed and dispersed.
Despite the violent confrontation market relationships did persist
between Europeans and Africans throughout the nineteenth century. 
These relationships were marked by trade in cattle, sheep, hides 
and ivory in exchange for cloth and other trade goods, including 
horses and guns (see Denoon and Nyeko pp.74-76). This trade had 
far reaching consequences for the communal base - or pre-capitalist 
mode of production - of the indigenous communities. Within the 
colonial boundaries Africans were transformed from being subsistence 
pastorialists into being traders or cheap labour for the Europeans. 
Beyond the frontiers they could combine subsistence production with 
production for trade with Europeans.
Trade in cattle and sheep meant a concerted effort on the part of
the Africans to use land for a profit motive rather than for subsistence. 
This change saw the creation of a peasant society within the colonial 
boundaries which was more or less becoming immersed in the capitalist 
mode of production conducted by the colonialists. John Saul and 
Roger Woods define peasants as "those whose ultimate security and 
subsistence lies in their having certain rights in land and in the 
labour of family members on the land, • but who are involved, through 
rights and obligations, in a wider economic system which includes 
the participation of non-peasants" ("African Peasantries" ed. 1971, 
pp.113).
29
The peasantisation of the indigenous communities had dire consequences 
for the structure of the community. A formerly self-sufficient 
society was systematically being divided, with those who could get 
hold of more land becoming better off than other members who had 
less access - that is, there was the creation of a semi-feudal mode of 
production alongside a developing capitalist society.
This social transformation was to take an even more dynamic turn 
by the 1870's. Until then colonial Southern Africa's major export 
on the international front had been wool. In 1867 diamonds were 
found on the banks of the Orange River. This was to have the most 
notable impact on Southern Africa. Before long large numbers of 
diamonds were found, so large as human experience had never encountered 
before. Thousands of prospectors flocked to the region.
Initially this produced a rather disarayed community of small 
prospectors with no central control over buying and selling. Trade 
in diamonds at first involved ad hoc buying and selling. The 
international diamond market would, however, not be able to tolerate 
this form of market relations; diamonds commanded high prices and 
if the market was to retain the high value of diamonds control over 
marketing practices had to be established. The obvious thing was 
to consolidate ownership of the various claims.
Such consolidation could take two forms; either the prospectors 
amalgamated their claims and mined the diamonds collectively as 
small companies or a big company with enough capital to buy the 
necessary claims could form a monopoly. The latter occurred. The 
holding company which undertook to establish a monopoly was the 
De Beers Consolidated Mines Co. financed by the European giant, 
Weinher, Beit and Company - and headed by John Cecil Rhodes - son 
of an English clergyman.
Under the monopoly of the De Beers Consolidated Mines Company the 
structure of the labour force changed. No longer was the labour 
process a matter of one man employing a handful of Africans to do 
the hard jobs. The company required a disciplined labour force.
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The new policy was to employ a white labour force to do the jobs 
that required skill and a black labour force to do the manual work. 
Wage levels between white and black were highly skewed with the 
black labourers being provided with just adequate accommodation 
and food to ensure a healthy and vigorous labour force. The other
discrepancy in labour relations was that while whites were more 
or less a permanent labour force, the blacks were recruited on a 
contract basis (contract labour) and forced to live in compounds 
for the duration of their contracts. This policy thus ensured the 
long-term availability of a regular supply of migrant labour which 
could be disciplined at the companies' will with the colonial 
administration's approval - Cecil Rhodes was Prime Minister of the 
Cape (1890-6).
The milestone of this period was the Glen Grey Act of 1894. It 
sought to solve the problem of displaced African populations. The 
Afrikaners who now controlled and owned fertile lands in the Orange 
Tree State and Transvaal wanted the locals removed from their lands. 
The more liberal sections wanted to see more individual ownership 
of lands amongst Africans. The compromise reached was that they 
could own land but were not allowed to vote for the Cape Parliament 
which was entirely white. Thus under the Glen Grey Act a few African 
families were allowed to own some land whilst retaining the majority 
as seasonal migrant labourers for the white farmers, pastorialists 
and the De Beers Mining Company.
The Glen Grey Act was a compromise between the hard minded Afrik­
aner and the liberals. However Rhodes as Prime Minister and 
billionaire was not satisfied with just claiming (by first using 
force then compromise) the lands of the Orange Tree State and the 
Transvaal. He had nourished a vision of British colonial expansion 
from Cape Town to Cairo in the North for some time. In 1890 he 
dispatched a column towards what is today known as Zimbabwe and 
Zambia to conquer the vast grasslands occupied by the Amandebele 
and Tshona communities north of the Limpopo River. The column 
heading North avoided conflict with the war-like Mandebele. They met 
little resistance from the Tshona whom they effectively subdued.
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Each man in the column had been promised two prospecting claims 
and a two thousand acre farm. One of their contemporaries described 
them like this, "such a mixed lot I never saw in my life, all sorts 
and conditions, from aristocrats down to the street vagrant, peers 
and wastes of humanity mingling together like a hotchpotch" (from 
Basil Davidson's "The Africans" Part V Channel 4 1982). This was 
the breed of men who eventually succeeded, through systematic and 
brutal dispossession of the Mandebele, in gaining for Rhodes the 
lands of the Zambesia (later to be named Rhodesia).
So far we have looked at; individual and commercial company's alienation 
of the African from his means of existence (the land); how African 
societies were disrupted and forced into becoming active members 
of the new capitalist mode of production; the coming into being
of a division of labour underpinned by a racist attitude towards 
labour relations. This attitude and social transformation was to 
establish itself along similar lines in the gold fields of the 
Transvaal. The labour reserves for the gold mines were to be partly 
situated in what was later to be known as the "high commission
territories" - British colonies supplying labour to the Transvaal
gold mines. The fate of these territories is discussed later.
The reader may also have noted that dispossession and occupation 
were effected mainly through and for commercial interests. This 
leaves the question of the role of the imperial forces.
British Involvement
The British presence in Southern Africa at first was intended to 
protect vital trading routes and interests in the Indian Ocean and
Asian empire;
"Over £90 million worth of trade involved the Cape route 
(as compared to £65 million through Suez), and by that 
broad period (1880) Asia accounted for 23.4% of British 
exports....and India alone had some £270 million of 
British capital invested in the Raj". (Deryck M. Schreuder 
"The Scramble for Southern Africa, 1877-1895", 1980 p.18-19).
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Thus for Britain, its initial involvement in South Africa was to 
protect the interests of companies and trading merchants in the 
metropolis. So vital was this strategic role that the British could 
not afford to lose hegemonic power at the Cape. In order to maintain 
the route the British had to realise that control of the Cape and 
the broader regions beyond were essential.
The British recognised that they did not have a monopoly over colonies 
in Africa. The discovery of gold and diamonds in the hinterland 
in the late 1860's altered Britain's policy underlining a new dimension 
in colonial policy; Britain must now seek to achieve and maintain 
an inviolate supremacy in Southern Africa. In tropical Africa the 
British had been mainly concerned with advancing colonial jurisdiction 
at an almost leisurely pace. In Southern Africa it was accepted 
that control had to be asserted over certain coastal and interior 
areas which were now of vast economic and political importance;
"the future development of South Africa was heavily 
dependant on its peaceful evolution as a modern plural 
and capitalist society, in which the British role was 
clearly absolutely crucial". (Schreuder p.20).
British expansion was to be conditioned by local inter-state politics 
and the balance of power within continental relationships. Portugal, 
the other colonial power in the region (Angola and Mozambique) was 
becoming a weak colonial power in the horizontal inter-continental 
power relationships of Europe and colonial Africa. On the other 
hand, Germany, under Bismarck, had also embarked upon a scramble 
for colonies in Southern Africa. The annexation of South West Africa 
as a German colony meant that an independent variable of great 
significance had been introduced. This and the fact that the Germans 
were also seeking alliances with the boer in the Transvaal and Orange 
Free State Republics meant that the British had to act decisively 
in pursuing their policy of hegemony in the region. The scramble 
for Southern Africa had begun.
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This scramble was to result in British annexation of the Transvaal, 
the crushing of the Zulus in the Natal region, the granting of
pretectorate status to Bachuahaland, BaSotholand and Swaziland. 
As the emphasis of this paper is centred around the B.L.S. countries 
it is the latter events which are considered in some detail.
(ii) THE HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES - 
 BLS AND THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
The High Commission Territories
Although the emergence of the Batswana, BaSotho and Swazi as national 
groups must historically be traced to the African migrations of
the 14th and 15th centuries, the factors which consolidated these 
societies into nation states must be attributed to the expansionist 
policies of the Afrikaners and the necessities of British imperial
policy. As has been noted above, the Afrikaners, having occupied 
the northern lands of the Free State, the Transvaal and parts of 
Natal, were engaged in a relentless push to claim as much land as
they could through violent means. The pressures of Afrikaner 
expansionism is claimed by many historians to have been the cause 
of British intervention in Bechaunaland, BaSotholand and Swaziland. 
(See for example R.P. Stevens in Southern Africa in Perspective 
ed. Potholm and Dale 1972, pp.98-99 and Wilson and Thompson, A History 
of South Africa to 1870, pp.445-446.) This may be true, especially in 
relation to the Swazi and BaSotho, but it is unlikely to have been 
the sole cause. The dictates of British imperial policy to a large 
extent necessitated the annexation of these lands - and this is 
particularly true of Bechuanaland.
The northeast (Bechaunaland) was seen by many as being of vital 
strategic importance. The Germans, who had colonised South West Africa 
in 1884 saw Bechaunaland as a gateway to the Transvaal and linkage 
with the Afrikaner state extending down to the Atlantic ocean. This 
posed a serious problem for the British who saw their monopoly over port 
facilities - Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Port Natal - being threatened. 
Furthermore the British had declared Rhodesia a British colony and the 
only routes to the new colony were through the Transvaal and the
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north east lands. It was this fear of losing hegemonic power on
the sub-continent that prompted the British to annex Bechaunaland
1
as a British "protectorate" in 1891.
The same fate befell the Swazi and BaSotho whose lands were declared 
British protectorates in 1890 and 1868 respectively. The BaSotho, 
constantly being harassed by the Afrikaners of the Orange Free State, 
sought British help to ward off further encroachment. British 
intervention was in the first instance initiated by the pleas of 
the BaSotho peoples. It would, however, be foolhardy to expect
that the British intervened solely because they were interested 
in protecting the BaSotho peoples. As early as the 1840's the British 
had recognised the importance of BaSotholand and had recognised 
the BaSotho people as "friends and allies". A friendly people 
between the Cape colony and the Transvaal was strategically vital 
given that the BaSotho were masters of the Drakensburg range which 
would prove to be vital to British interest during the Anglo-Boer war.
The Swazis, also under pressure of Afrikaner encroachment,, which 
threatened to swallow all Swaziland into the Transvaal, were led
to appeal to the British for protection. This was granted on a 
similar basis as that of Bechaunaland and BaSotholand. The lands
occuped by the Swazis were seen as of certain economic importance 
by the Afrikaners and British. It was the gateway from the north­
eastern Transvaal to the port of Natal. The British, though reluctant 
to interfere at the beginning, could not rule out Swaziland's strategic 
importance, and in 1880 intervened.
British concern and involvement in the scramble for the frontier 
lands of the Swazi, Batswana and BaSotho was therefore marked by
strategic questions rather than humanitarian ones. It was an 
involvement and intervention which kept an eye on the possibility of 
securing metropolitan interests and at the same time (especially in 
the case of Bechaunaland and Swaziland) meeting the demands, in kind 
and resources of the local colonialists (Rhodes in Bechuanaland) and 
Afrikaner frontier agencies for expansion (Swaziland).
■^ The term is actually misleading, since what was actually effected was 
colonisation.
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For the legal scholar, the means used for determining the subsequent
boundaries of Swaziland are of particular interest. At the heart
of the scramble for Swaziland can be identified two sets of "legal"
documents: "the documents that killed us", as Swazi oral tradition
2
would maintain. The first set consisted of very local documents 
and involved concessions granted by the Swazi king to the frontier 
agents of Afrikaner expansionism. The second set were a series 
of constitutional (treaties?) agreements entered into between the 
British and Afrikaners delineating rights to the land in Swaziland. 
The concession documents indicated how, at ground level, a local 
creeping position was taking place as the Afrikaners of the Transvaal 
moved in to take Swazi territory piecemeal. Given that the Swazis 
occupied rich grazing lands also suitable for agriculture and 
potentially rich in minerals^concessionaires poured into Swaziland 
intent on using legal documents to defraud the Swazi king and deprive 
the Swazis of their natural resources. What was in fact happening 
was that economic warfare disguised as legal contracting of land 
had been declared on an unsuspecting people. Schreunder describes it:
"Were the Swazis aware that they were signing away their
land and sovereignty in perpetuity in the concession
documents? It seems unlikely. For a start, the king 
wrongly presumed that the concessions merely granted 
usufructs of Swazi resources, 'In granting land concessions' 
as a missionary recorded, 'Mbandzeni had always been under 
the impression that he had granted the lifetime of the 
actual petitioner' . It is also apparent that the king and 
his counsellors never fully grasped the meaning and 
intent of the dozens of concessions thrust before them - 
some on highly technical subjects....everything from
land to minerals, banking to farming, print to oil
extraction, takking to building, photography to pawn-broking 
was in fact covered". (The Scramble for Southern Africa, 
pp.278-279.)
What is also of significance about this particular form of appropriation
is that by the late 19th Century the form through which Europeans took
land off locals was now transformed from the rudimentary violent
techniques employed at the beginning of expansionism to more subtle 
^See Schreuder at pp.278-286.
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forms couched in legal camouflage. This was due not to the fact 
that the Afrikaners had become civilised but can be attributed to 
the development of an industrial capitalist society in South Africa 
which saw no need to conquer when legal means could be used to the 
same effect, and also to British imperial policy representing the 
interests of this new society. The moral validity of laws allowing 
for what was clearly fraudulent agreement was never questioned. In 
fact the British as the colonisers saw to it that such agreements 
were given effect (Schreuder pp.279-286 and Bonner "Kings, Commoners 
and Concessionaires", 1982 Chap.10).
These concessions and the second set of documents - conventions 
entered into between Britain and the Transvaal had by 1890 reduced 
Swazi territory by half and had effectively ensured that what was 
left was not in Swazi hands but those of the concessionaries, what 
had been established in so far as metropolitan interests were concerned 
was an indirect collaboration empire of settler authority. This 
system ensured that the British could control Swaziland without 
the maximum cost of running a direct and expensive trusteeship form 
of rule. This system also allowed for harmony with the Afrikaners 
of the Transvaal who retained, under the convention of 1884, certain 
specified agricultural and grazing rights. This arrangement lasted 
until the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer war - of 1899 when the running 
of Swaziland was undertaken by the office of the British governor 
in the Transvaal until 1906. After that date authority was transferred 
to the British High Commissioner at the Cape who was already responsible 
for administering Bechaunaland and BaSotholand - hence the phrase, 
"high commission territories".
The high commission territories can be seen as colonial properties 
of Britain in the South African periphery. Their position as colonies 
was unique in two senses. First they were what can only be described as 
colonies of a colony. Their position was unlike other African colonies 
under British rule in that Britain exercised control through another 
colony giving rise to a metropolis (Britain), semi-periphery (Cape 
Colony), periphery (B.L.S.) relationship. The second feature arose 
out of their geographic placement. Being landlocked they were 
inextricably tied both politically and economically to South Africa. 
Economically the territories would be used as a huge labour reserve
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for the gold and diamond mines of South Africa. They also shared a 
common feature with other African colonies; the transport and 
communications system was outward looking, geared towards export 
outwith the continent. For the high commission territories being 
landlocked meant that whatever commodity they produced would have 
to depend on the South African transport network. Politically the 
territories were bound together . to share the same fate through British 
colonisation being later administered from what was initially a British 
colony - handed down to the Afrikaners. It is without doubt that 
even though -the British high commissioner interposed a British presence 
between the territories and the subsequent Union of South Africa, 
it was South Africa which would reap the benefits from the strange 
periphery - semi-periphery - metropolis relationship. In other words 
the semi-periphery would play the major role in shaping future events 
in the periphery as opposed to the metropolis being the major influence. 
As shall be seen later, what is being asserted here is that even 
though the British colonised the high commission teritories and 
administered them under the name of the crown it would be South African 
political and economic influence which would determine the future 
internal and international relations of these territories.
The Union of South Africa
By 1895 the Afrikaner drive towards autonomous government which began 
with the trekboers (discussed above) had been realised. The Afrikaners 
now controlled the Orange Free State and the Transvaal (also known 
as the South African Republic) as separate republics from the British 
colonies of Natal and the Cape Colony. As in Kimberly (diamonds) 
in the Orange Free State, gold reserves of immense quantities had been 
found in the Rand area around Johannesburg in the late 1870's. This 
in effect completed the mineral revolution. The main feature of 
appropriation of gold in the Transvaal was foreign capital - mainly 
British. Therefore, even though the local government in both the 
Orange Free State and the Transvaal were in Afrikaner landowners 
hands, the fact that the major products - gold and diamonds - which 
accounted for almost 95% of total exports and were foreign controlled 
meant that those states were what Denoon and Nyeko call "classic 
banana republics" (Southern Africa Since 1800 pp.96-107).
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However, the Transvaal, under the stalwart leadership of the Afrikaner, 
Paul Kruger sought to undermine the status quo. The Afrikaners'hatred 
of British control born of the old treker days drove Kruger and his 
government to impose strict fiscal arrangements. He imposed high 
taxes and high rail-freight costs which left the mining companies 
with minimal profit margins. The Transvaal also recognised that 
Britain could be undermined through the importation of other European 
metropolitan capital which would interject, allowing for more autonomy. 
Although the Transvaal's prosperity did attract speculators and bankers 
from all over Europe, Kruger was faced with the frustrating fact that 
the Transvaal being landlocked - in fact circled by British controlled 
territory - it was still heavily dependent on British ports to export 
its wealth. It was this frustration which led Kruger to court the 
Germans in German South-West Africa with the possibility of gaining 
access to the sea from the west. Germany, already becoming a major 
European industrial power, was seen by the British as a threatening 
presence and Kruger's actions they could not tolerate. The Transvaal, 
being the wealthiest of the states in South Africa could not be allowed 
to fall into German hands. This would have had the effect of totally 
disrupting British hegemony in the sub-continent. Since the Napoleonic 
wars Britain had been the major power in Europe and effectively 
controlled the world's seaways. At the turn of the century this 
monopoly of world power was being challenged by other nations such 
as Japan, the United States and Germany. Towards the end of the 
nineteenth century it had become obvious that Britain could not retain 
its hegemonic power in Southern Africa through mere control of the 
Cape peninsula and the major ports. The. wealth which had been 
discovered in the interior meant that if South Africa was not to 
become a playground of metropolitan conflicts Britain must gain total 
economic control and keep the whole cake for itself.
Rhodes saw the Transvaal as the key to total British control. The 
imperial office already deeply concerned over Kruger's policies allowed 
Rhodes to send a small band of armed men to the Transvaal to remove 
Kruger. This group, led by a crony of Rhodes called Jameson, were 
defeated by the Afrikaners. The failure of the "Jameson raid" (as it 
was subsequently named) was seen by Kruger as a victory over the 
British and increased his confidence to bring in! Germany as a 
possible metropolitan ally. This raid pinpoints the change in attitudes
regarding the imperial factor; Schreuder suggests that:
"the raid represented, in certainly its seamiest light,
the disturbing power of the New Imperialism's continuing 
role in Southern Africa. The energy, the belligerence,
the impatience, the greed, the expansive zeal of the 
local empire makers and conquerors, merely took on new
forms as this force of the New Imperialism turned away 
from territorial objectives per se, and was instead, 
channelled into commercial, diplomatic and subversive
strategies for advancing the particular aims of the groups 
involved." (The Scramble for Southern Africa, p.315).
The failure of Rhodes' actions deeply offended the British imperial 
office. Joseph Chamberlain,the British Colonial Secretary (1895-1903) 
immediately dispatched Alfred Milner as the new High •Commissioner
to the Cape. Milner upon arrival in South Africa set about to reassert 
British influence. His conclusion was that the only way to deal
with Kruger would be to give him an ultimatum; he could either give
voting rights to the so called "Uitlanders" who represented British 
interests, or face the British armies. Kruger's options were limited, 
he could not grant the white Uitlanders the vote as this would mean 
the risk of losing control over the Transvaal's state machinery and 
on the other hand he could face the military might of British forces 
and still risk losing. He chose the latter option and in late 1899 
the Anglo-Boer war broke out.
This war epitomises the highest stage in the scramble for Southern 
Africa. Whoever came out as victor would control the sub-continent 
and its resources - both human and material. In the event the British 
won the war. But the consequences of victory were highly unusual; 
in this historical epoch the vanquished would usually become subserviant 
to the victor. However this was not the case for Southern Africa.
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On 31st May 1902 the Afrikaners surrendered and signed a peace with 
the British. On that date the Union Jack was the flag that flew 
in all the South African States. Britain viewed South Africa as 
one of its settler colonies occupying the same position as Canada 
and Australia on the imperial policy agenda. This meant that local 
elections could be held along a multi-party system. The Afrikaners 
having organised themselves into cohesive political units under the 
leadership of Afrikaner generals decisively won local elections along 
these lines: Transvaal - 1907 Het Volk party led by Generals Louis
Botha and Jan Smuts, Orange Free State - 1908 Orangia Unie led by 
Generals J. Hertzog and Christia de West, Cape - 1908 coalition of 
Afrikaners and English speaking whites led by J.X. Merriman^.
The Natal was largely controlled by English speaking whites and had 
been self governed prior to and after the war. The consolidation 
of Afrikaner power after the war would seem to suggest that even 
though the British had won the war they were losing the peace. However 
these resultant events are misleading. Britain had disposed of the 
German threat and had made South Africa safe for British capital.
This must be seen in view of the post-war events as the main aim
of the imperial factor - the maintenance of a lucrative market for 
British goods and investment. British capital controlled the major
resources - diamonds and gold; gold by this time had become the staple 
export.
/
The winning of local elections by Afrikaner groups, made possible 
by British imperial policy towards South Africa, also created the 
mood for the most important historical event of the era - the 
unification of all the states of South Africa as one single state. 
The union of South Africa was not only desired by the Afrikaners, 
imperial policy was very accomodating since a union meant political 
stability for the region. In 1908 and 1909 conferences were held
at the Cape to discuss the proposed union. The delegates drafted an 
Act of Union which the British imperial government passed into law in 
1910. This created the Union of South Africa led by Louis Botha 
with Jan Smuts in close attendance.
See Denoon and Nyeko, p.
The Union was achieved through some clever manoeuvering by the imperial 
office. Britain recognised the need to harmonise its relations with 
the local settler community. At the same time the creation of a 
successor state to protect imperial interests.was recognised as more 
important than conflict with the Afrikaners.
All these events occured without any consultations with the majority 
of the peoples of South Africa. The imperial office would not grant 
any political rights to Africans since this was vehemently opposed 
by the Afrikaners who were to become the custodians and guardians 
of British capital. What had in fact happened was that the British 
and Afrikaners had entered into a social contract in which they agreed 
that the British, on the one hand, would bring the Afrikaner into 
the modern world by agreeing to share political power with him, and 
that the Afrikaner, on the other hand, would agree not to stand in 
the way of the advancement and domination of British capital. They 
also agreed that the African majority would not be party to this 
contract. They (The Africans) would remain at the disposal of the 
parties to the contract to be used in whatever manner the parties
saw fit.4
The question that must be asked is why did the British sucumb to 
Afrikaner wishes to impose backward practices insofar as the indigenous 
population was concerned. The only possible explanation would seem 
to be that British capital at this period still clung to primitive 
methods of accumulation. This is evidenced by historical fact.
In the early 1800's the British had abolished slavery. They however 
had anther method for the Cape - the Vagrancy Act of 1809 (see(Mbeki 
"The Historical Injustice" p.137). This in effect provided that 
all Khois not in the employ of a white person were vagrants and thus 
criminals. In order to prove that you were not a vagrant you had 
to produce a pass. In order to get a pass you had to enter into 
a written labour contract with a white employer. This in effect 
was a new form of forced labour aimed at controlling labour supplies for 
British capital. In Europe by the late 19th century such methods
had disappeared with the worker having the right to vote thus able 
to express his wish and influence on matters of state. In Southern 
Africa this was not to be the case. Effectively capitalism means 
the maximisation of profit through increased accumulation. This
^Discussed by Mbeki "The Historical Injustice"
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drive towards more and more profit must be gained at minimum labour 
cost to the capitalist. Accumulation in South Africa would thus 
ensure that this goal is realised through maximum exploitation of 
labour, which could be realised through the use of primitive methods 
of accumulation. Unlike Europe where the role of the working classes 
had been decisive in the bourgeois battle against feudalism and was 
thus owed a debt by the capitalist class, in South Africa British 
capital owed nothing to the African masses. One of the most significant 
features of the Anglo-Boer war’pointed'.out by Denoon and Nyeko (pp. 122-124) 
was the fact that the British did not employ the help of Africans 
to fight the Afrikaners. This was a striking anomally since in all 
their colonial wars the British had engaged locals to help them - 
East and West African troops, Indian solidiers, Maoris in Australia. 
This feature, however, is not confusing when one considers that British 
capital did not wish to become indebted to Africans.
The attitude of British capital compounded with the racist ideology 
of the Afrikaner thus created the scene for a continuation of a 
primitive and unjust system of labour exploitation. The Union of 
South Africa was to extend its barbaric labour practices to all migrant 
labour from without the Union.
Aside from the internal consequences of the Act of Union the peoples 
of the high commission territores had to contend with a new drive 
by the Afrikaners to incorporate them into the Union.
The possibility of -incorporation was a very real one at the 1908-1909 
Cape conferences. For the Afrikaners incorporation was a natural 
geographical and economic consequence of union. Georgraphically 
it was desirable that white economic and political domination be 
established over the whole region as soon as possible (Stevens pp.102- 
103). Economically the three territories were almost totally dependant 
on the adjacent South African colonies - especially the Transvaal 
- for markets and employment. It is this dependence which must now 
be looked at.
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(iii) Dependency Relations 1910~
Historically the roots of the dependency links which were to dominate 
relations between the high commission territories and South Africa 
should ultimately be traced to the 19th century activities of capital 
in the region. We have seen the events which led to the transformation 
of the mode of production in the region. However, formalisation 
of dependency links must be traced to the 1910 Customs Agreement 
between the Union of South Africa on the one hand and the high 
commission territories on the other. The issue of incorporation 
is of great relevance to an understanding of the formal ties.
Prior to and after the 1910 Act of Union it was taken for granted 
by the British and Afrikaners that Britain, in due course, would ( 
hand over, if not sovereignty, then protection of the three territories 
to South Africa. That the British viewed the transfer as favourable 
was of no doubt. The one obstacle to incorporation was the policy 
obligation the imperial government had declared in London in 1908, 
that "pending any grant of representation to 'natives', no 'native' 
territory now administered by the Governor or High Comissioner will 
be placed under the control of the new Responsible Governments" (Stevens 
p.100). To the observer this policy consideration would seem to 
take into account the wishes of the local population, that is, the 
British would seek representations from the locals. There was no 
doubt that the African population of the territories were vehemently 
opposed to any rule by Afrikaners. Thus, one may be tempted to believe 
that Britain's refusal to transfer the territories to South Africa 
was based upon considerations for the plight of the locals. This view 
is one shared by Arnold Isaacs who states (at p.30) that "....the 
British felt obligated to the peoples of these territories who loathed 
having to come under the white minority of the newly to be formed 
Union". Ronald Hyam, who seems to believe that the refusal by Britain 
to transfer the territories was a repudiation of Afrikaner native 
policy (i.e. apartheid) states that, "without transfer the territories 
stood as a living argument against that policy and a reproach to 
the ideology which underpinned it" (The Failure of South African 
Expansion 1908-1948 at pp.75-76).
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The belief that Britain was acting solely upon the policy of Mthe 
necessity of prior consultation" with the African people of the 
territories is misleading when related to Section 151 of the 1909 
South African Act as amended by Britain and which set out the issue 
of incorporation. This Act in part stated (Section 151):
"The King, with the advice of the Houses of Parliament 
of the Union, transfer to the Union the government of 
any territories, other than the territories administered 
by the British South Africa Company, belonging to or 
under the protection of His Majesty, and inhabited wholly 
or in part by natives, and upon such transfer the Governor- 
General-in-Council may undertake the government of such 
territory upon the terms and conditions in the Schedule 
to this Act." (As quoted by Stevens p.101).
The point about Section 151 is that it gave absolutely no mention 
of consultation with Africans but only representation by Afrikaners. 
It also shows that the territories were viewed as British property
at the disposal of the Crown. Taking Hyam's argument that imperial
policy on the issue was dictated by desires to express repugnance 
for Afrikanedom1s native policy seems to be more reasonable. This 
is so because it would have been fitting with imperial policy that
the territories be used as political tools against the growing extremist 
Afrikaner element in Union politics.
It was to be that the African population in the three territories
would thus live under the threat of incorporation until the mid-1960's. 
Section 151 of the South Africa Act was the legal vehicle upon which 
the British government could legally dispose of the territories without 
the necessity of consulting the Africans. The future of the territories 
had been decided without consultation with the local people. British 
attitude to the three territories reflects the rudimentory approach 
of the powerful metropolis states to the concept of acquisition of 
territory. It is no surprise that Britain saw the territories as 
property in the private law analogy which meant that a right to self
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determination did not exist for those inhabiting the property or
territory. This right, now recognised as a fundamental one under
international law, was denied to the local people because they were
5
simply a commodity to be disposed of together with the territory.
This attitude is further reflected in the use of the adult population 
of the territories as seasonal migrant labour for the mines of South 
Africa and the lack of British investment capital in the territories. 
British capital had invested heavily in the South African mining 
and industrial sectors. It was therefore only logical that the
territories be used by capital as labour reserves. It was also
expedient to British interests that Bechuanaland, BaSotholand and 
Swaziland became markets for South Africa's agricultural products. 
The white South Africans had to be given a piece of the cake even 
if this meant suppressing local production through giving effect
to concessionary agreements obtained through the most unlawful means. 
Concessionary agreements had given white South Africa the right to 
turn productive land into large concerns producing for external markets.
Britain's refusal to incorporate the territories must therefore not 
be seen as an attempt to allow for the autonomous development of
capitalism within these territories. In fact the opposite is true. 
South Africa was accorded the dominant role and the territories were 
destined to become heavily dependent on South Africa in every way. 
It was through the Customs Union Agreement that this relationship 
would be made formal and more secure and efficient. This gave off 
an atmosphere of legality which was welcome to the parties involved, 
i.e. Britain and South Africa. Looking at this relationship Isaacs 
puts it thus:
"The similarities between the... territories and the 
'native reserves' put aside for South Africa's black 
majority were indeed very close. Their posts and telegraphs, 
money affairs including their currencies, as well as 
their customs and tariffs were entirely run by the South 
African government. A large percentage of their working 
population was employed inside S.A. Also higher education 
for their children was only available in South African
institutions...(pp.31-32).
°For a discussion of the issue of territory and self-determination see 
Anthony Carty "The Decay of International Law" 1986 Chap. 4.
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Such was the extent of the dependence on South Africa that the socio­
economic base necessary for cultural and economic development had been 
completely disrupted. Traditional societies based on a land-tenure 
system of production were .Alienated Crom the land in order to service 
South African capital. Whatever infrastructure was provided was 
not for the benefit of the local population. It was strictly geared 
towards the needs of white South Africa with skeletal railway and 
road systems developed for purposes of transporting primary products 
into South Africa. Such -were, the problems faced by these countries 
at independence that it led one author to observe:
"Both the natural and the human resources of the former 
Territories are underdeveloped, and any meaningful economic 
programme for them must not only develop natural resources 
but also provide industrial skills and economic 
opportunities for the Africans. The proportion of skilled 
to unskilled members of the labour force must be 
progressively increased from the current low figure of 
under five per cent of the total force until it approaches 
the level obtaining in developed countries." (Dr. H.
George Henry writing in Richard P. Stevens, "Lesotho, 
Botswana and Swaziland" 1967 Pall Mall).
Suffice it to say that these thoughts were echoed by the locals but 
such thoughts were to be dashed by the reality of the dependency 
links.
On the question of incorporation the Afrikaners never did get their 
wish to see a white dominated Southern Africa. By the late 1950's 
a new political mood gripped the whole continent - independence was 
forthcoming. The winds of change which swept through Africa did 
not bypass the peoples of the high commission territories. Through 
internal and international pressure the British conceded independence 
to Bechuanaland on 30 September 1966 to become Botswana, to BaSotholand 
on 4 October 1966 adopting the name Lesotho and to Swaziland on 6 
September 1968.
However, despite the euphoria of independence a new reality began to 
unfold itself in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa. It had been political 
independence which had been granted. Economic and cultural independence
47
were almost non-existent. The question which was asked by many was, 
is there any meaning to political independence when you do not control 
your own economy. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) did not 
only not have control over the productive process, they were also 
economically and to a lesser extent politically dependent on neigh­
bouring South Africa. Production and the movement of capital in 
South Africa determined the productive capacity of the BLS which 
in turn affected the political process. This relationship is seen
g
by Richard Dale as the South African Legacy . Unlike other former 
colonies in Africa > whose subsequent relations would be determined 
by former colonial ties, the BLS relations would be determined not 
extensively by their former colonial ties to Britain, but by their 
ties to a former British colony, later a member of the "old" British 
Commonwealth. The extent to which the BLS were dependant on Britain 
can only be seen through an appraisal of the movements of British 
capital within South Africa. As has already been mentioned, the 
foreign mining capital in South Africa was largely British. It was 
the mining sector which gave rise to the subsequent growth of the 
manufacturing base of South Africa leading to its definitive status 
as the leading industrial state in Africa. The results of the mining 
sector whose productive capacity and profitability depended largely 
on cheap labour from the BLS may be seen in the theoretical approach 
adopted by Johan Galtung (see Part. I). A relative spin-off effect 
of the mining sector was the birth of a local industrial sector 
initially geared toward the immediate needs of the mining sector. 
This was to become a general spin-off creating base industries through 
the capacity of the mining sector to generate foreign exchange. Foreign 
exchange is essential to the establishement and development of a 
manufacturing sector within the international capitalist economy. 
Most developing economies seldom have the economic capacity to generate 
enough foreign exchange - through the exportation of capital goods 
needed by the industrialised countries - to fulfill high capital 
import requirements necessary to establish a viable manufacturing 
sector. These problems were not faced by South Africa whose huge
0
"Botswana" in Southern Africa in Perspective Essays in Regional 
Politics ed. Part 3, Chap. 2, pp.111-112.
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export earnings enabled it to overcome inadequacies of foreign 
exchange.
The point being made here is that the growth of the South African
economy largely depended on the mining sector's earnings which were
largely controlled by British concerns. This is the economic link
which ties the BLS to Britain in the first instance. Therefore when
looking at the international economic dependence of the BLS, one
must look first to the South African connection and not to Britain.
This of course must not be taken to mean that modern forms of dependency
links (for example bank loans) have not manifested themselves, creating
direct dependence relations between Britain and the BLS. However,
through investigation I suspect one would find that South African
based British concerns are largely responsible - the scope of this
7
paper does not allow for such an investigation.
The South African connection is therefore the referal link in dependency
g
relations between the BLS and Britain. However one must be careful 
not to put to much emphasis on this connection (South Africa - Britain) 
as it would be construed to mean that South African capital is itself 
dependant on Britain or other metropolises. What is meant here is 
that any view that Britain is the core of the BLS periphery is highly 
doubtful in the contemporary period. Some researchers in fact see 
South Africa as the metropolis or core of the Southern African periphery 
(see for example, P. Selwyn Industries in the Southern African Periphery 
I.D.S. 1975). The descriptive terminology of writers would seem 
to depend upon whether the study is carried out as one of a regional 
sub-system or an international one. When viewed from an international 
perspective it is arguable that South Africa is not the Core. Without 
moving into the intricacies of what the truth is - this would depend 
on a highly empirical study beyond the scope of this paper - we are
_
For a treatment of the spin-off efects of the mining industry in South 
Africa see Jill Nattrass, The South African Economy "Its growth and 
change" 1981, pp.129-161.
g
The relations of south African capital to international capital are 
discussed by First, Steel & Gurrey in The South African Connection 
"Western Investment in Apartheid" 1972; also see Elizabeth Schmidt, 
Decoding Corporate Camouflage "US Business Support for Apartheid" 
I.P.S. 1980.
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looking at regional relations and it is highly unlikely that there 
is any other country which can claim to have the same dependence 
links as those established between the BLS and South Africa. The 
core-semi periphery-periphery relationship described elsewhere in 
this paper as being between Britain, South Africa and the BLS countries 
is certainly true of the period that was being discussed. However, 
the evolution and growth of the South African economy must put paid 
to this type of relationship in the post-second world war era.
This point also brings us back to the theories discussed in Part One.
Wallerstein's description of a possible three-way relationship (core-
semi periphery-periphery) in the world capitalist system seems to
be fitting to our study up to the 1940's. Both Wallerstein and Frank
tended to believe that the autonomous development of capitalism is
not possible in the periphery. However Wallerstein's argument for
a semi-periphery (befitting of early South Africa) that, even though
the semi-periphery has a large degree of political autonomy in decision
making, the economy is still largely controlled by the metropolis
is doubtful when applied to contemporary South Africa. That South
Africa is today a fully integrated capitalist state with all the
attributes of the modern industrial capitalist economy cannot be
doubted. This point is partly recognised by Wallerstein writing
g
in 1985 an "The Stages of African Involvement in the World Economy" 
who still maintains that South Africa is a semi-peripheral country 
and puts it into the same category as Zaire, Nigeria", Algeria and 
Egypt. This rejection of a fully integrated capitalist economy in 
South Africa warrants a further look at the nature of the political 
economy of South Africa, through the mirror of the modes of production 
analysis chosen in Part I of this paper.
As mentioned above, the development of the mining industry in South 
Africa had an enormous impact on capital accumulation and that this 
created spin-off effects which were to result in the diversification 
of capital allocation. The fact that most of the initial mining 
stock was foreign controlled cannot by itself warrant a conclusion 
that the economy would subsequently be controlled by foreign interests,
_
In Political Economy of Contemporary Africa 2nd edition 1985 Sage
ed. p. 54.
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giving rise to South African dependence on foreign capital. Indeed, 
such a conclusion may be taken for granted given that in most 
undeveloped economies, dependent on mining for export earnings, relatively 
little growth takes place since they produce raw materials to be 
consumed by industries in developed countries from which the initial 
investment originated. It is now an established policy of primary 
product exporters to plead the case for re-investment of these 
surpluses exported to the western world. However, it is equally 
true that political intervention by the state may force locally based 
foreign concerns to reinvest their earnings in the local economy. 
This is the epitome of political independence; being able to control 
the productive process through political decision making must 
necessarily ensure the protection of local interests, that is, 
development."^
The thesis being presented, therefore, is that through control of 
the state machinery the South African government was able to force 
increased reinvestment. Political independence attained early in 
the century laid the basis for political intervention. The strategies 
adopted by the former generals of the Anglo-Boer war were not dissimilar 
to those which had been used by Kruger in the Transvaal. The aim 
was not to remove foreign (British) ownership but rather to force 
the international capitalists to make South Africa a viable economy.
Coupled with abundant cheap labour, huge agricultural potential, 
a pleasant climate and appealing landscape, the vast mineral resource 
potential attracted huge capital inflows and skilled labour from 
Europe. Combined with the rise of nationalism in the inter-war period 
these factors combined to produce the rapid development of South 
Africa into an industrial empire resulting in a politico-socio-economic 
structure unequalled in Africa . This is what differentiates between 
South Africa and the four countries mentioned by Wallerstein. The rise 
of capitalist relations in South Africa are very much unlike those 
of the rest of African countries. However, this is not enough to
To -
See Nattrass Chap. 8 and Heribert Adam "South Africa: Political
Alternatives and Prognosis" in Conflict and Change in Southern Africa
1978, ed. Chap. 9.
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adequately explain the development of capitalism in South Africa. 
English capital had a monopoly iin the pre-second world war period. 
Even though early political independence had given rise to the rise
of what is termed a "truly national bourgeosie" by Adam (p.220) - an
essential component of autonomy - inroads had to be made into this 
monopoly. This was done through a plea by the nationalists to
Afrikanerdom1s ethnicity. The ability to consolidate Afrikaner support
for economic mobilisation came from the Afrikaner's pyschological
• . f U
fixation as a purist group with a God-given right to "their", land
and resources. The strategies adopted laid emphasis on a "buy Afrikaans" 
policy aimed at their "psychological susceptibility for an ideal
of collective sacrifice and solidarity, particularly among the growing 
dislocated and proletarianized Afrikaner workforce in the cities." 
(Adam p. 221).
With full Afrikaner control of the state machinery after the elections 
of 1948 where the National Party (NP) won a resounding victory over
the more liberal elements of South African politics, the stage was
set for full state participation in the economy. Through parastatal 
organisations and wholly state owned corporations such as ISCOR - 
steel and iron, F0SK0R, ESCOM - electricity, SASOL - oil from coal, 
and S0EK0R, the state was able, by the early 70's to consolidate 
at least 11% of the capital share in the industrial sector, (Adam,
p. 221, Nattrass, p.163). The ability to harness the ethnic 
vulnerability of the Afrikaners and consolidate capital gains underlines 
the particular strength of the,state as a bullwark of state capitalism 
- a point dismissed by the dependencias who do not see the role of 
the state as a vehicle of development.
Together with the rise of state capitalism emerged the only African 
national burgeoisie. The emergence of this group was strongly 
influenced by the policies of a nationalist government whose aim 
was to create an atmosphere of South African ownership of capital. 
Examples of the dispersal of capital into different sectors can be 
seen in the practices of the mining giants. The link between the 
growing mining sector and the infant manufacturing industry were
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initiated by the mining companies as early as the beginning of the
century. Nattrass gives us two examples of diversification - the
giant Dee Beers' move into the explosives industry and the decision
by Goldfields to move into the industrial sphere. She also records
that one of the major mining groups in the industry, Anglo American,
"was to all practical purposes locally orientated rather than foreign
orientated, since from 1924 on nearly 90% of its total economic
activities were centred in Southern Africa" (pp. 144-145) taken from
Innes, D : The Mining Industry in the Context of South Africa's Economic
Development, 1910-1940, I.C.S. 1977). This early diversification
can partly be attributed to apartheid's labour policy. This ensured
that mineowners had a large supply of cheap, unskilled, black labour,
11
whose docility was ensured by the state apparatus. Diversification can 
also be attributed to the nature of monopoly capitalism in South 
Africa. Big monopolies tend to control not only core industries 
but also their service industries. In order to do this they have 
to diversify investment from the core industries.
Again the post-war period saw a massive rise in agricultural production 
through new incentives, brough about by a policy of mechanisation. 
Today the agricultural sector, dominated by the large agribusiness 
multinational, Rembrant, provides 30% of the country's non-gold exports 
(Philip Ehrensaft 1984p-85). The industrialisation and mechanisation 
of agriculture saw an increase in the ownership of the means of 
production by Afrikaner businessmen.
State encouragement has also allowed the Afrikaner controlled monetary 
sector to flourish. The movement of savings into Afrikaner insurance 
companies such as Sanlam and Santam and banks such as the giant Volkskas 
and the FVB investment company, the increased Afrikaner domination 
of important shareholdings in industry, mining and commerce, all 
point to the emergency of a strong bourgeois amongst the white Afrikaner. 
This bourgeois class may be the dominant strata of the bourgeois 
social class in South Africa. The fact that the state apparatus
The changing interests and attitudes of mining capital in relation to 
the labour process are discussed by Merle Lipton "Capitalism" and 
Apartheid", Chap. 5.
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is stated nearly entirely by Afrikaners ensured a strong and dominant 
influence. This dominance is evidenced by the almost casual brush-off 
way the state is willing to treat multinationals such as Anglo-American 
on the issue of social change and sanctions.
This brief outline of the South African economy points to factors 
indicating a very strong economy which in terms of advancement is 
far ahead of Nigeria, Zaire, Algeria and Egypt - in terms of industrial 
output, economic growth and formation of social classes. It is a 
strong economy dovetailed to a strong, autonomous arms industry capable 
of generating highly developed military hardware unequalled in Africa.
It is this enormous economic and military capacity which allows South 
Africa to play the role of imperial master on the sub-continent.
It is also this strength which has allowed the state to hold on to 
its repugnant policy of apartheid despite international condemnation 
on all fronts.
Without condemning Wallerstein's description of South Africa as a 
semi-periphery one should point out that to Gategorise in such a geheral 
manner is theoretically dangereous. That South Africa exercises 
economic control and thus largely dictates policy is without doubt. 
The three countries being discussed in this paper are formally 
"independent" but have been held through their short lives as hostages 
of South Africa's policies. The relationship which exists between 
these states can only be defined as core-periphery relations, albeit 
with South Africa as a continental metropolis with pariah status 
on the international arena.
Arguably the most important tool through which South Africa exercises 
its control is via the Customs Union Agreement.
(iv) The Customs Union
A customs union has been in existence between South Africa and the 
BLS since 1910. The 1910 agreement was concluded between South Africa 
and the British administration responsible for the three high commission 
territories. It was an agreement which was made without consulting 
the peoples of the territories concerned. Seen in light of the
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circumstances surrounding the issue of incoporation (discussed above), 
it was simply a concession granted by the British to the Afrikaner's 
quest for the territories. This agreement was designed to meet the 
requirements of a free customs union under which it was agreed that 
the territories would adopt and maintain South African customs and 
excise duties to apply on a reciprocal basis. This would allow for 
the equitable sharing of revenue from customs and excise duties. 
It would also allow for the free interchange of products and goods 
produced within the customs union.
For all intents and purposes this agreement was favourable to the 
South African government since it was founded on the basis of the 
understanding that the territories would eventually become part of 
the Republic of South Africa. When it became apparent in the early 
60 's that Britain was going to relinguish control not to South Africa 
but to the locals, the mood on both sides shifted. The South Africans 
saw the agreement as inadequate in terms of protecting their interests 
and the BLS viewed the agreement as being wholly unfair given South 
Africa's developed economy.
The case for the BLS was summed up by the Botswana Transitional Plan 
for-Social and Economic Development 1966.
"The actual tariffs levied are determined by South African 
interests. High protective duties imposed to protect 
South African industry tend to diminish the total revenue
collected. In such cases the diversion of customers 
from cheaper overseas imports to more expensive South
African manufacturers results in a transfer of spending 
power from (BLS) consumes to South African producers, 
(reproduced; Dale "Botswana"). (pll4).
It was also felt by economists in the BLS that since they could not 
levy a duty on imports from South Africa this in essence meant that 
whatever competing industries they tried to establish would be undercut 
by cheaper products from South Africa. This pointed to the immense
economic power of South Africa when ;cpmpared to the BLS. The total 
percentages of revenue received by the BLS in 1966 reflects the 
inbalance; Botswana 0.27622 per cent, Swaziland 0.14900 per cent,
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Lesotho 0.88575 per cent compared to South Africa's 98.68903 per 
cent (Date p.114).
One of the most glaring inequalities of the customs union was the 
fact that the decision making was undertaken unilaterally by South. 
Africa. The 1910 agreement made no provision for any consultation 
procedures. This reflects the South African legacy inherited by 
the BLS. The agreement was essentially entered into between Britian 
and South Africa with the high commissioner signing for the BLS. 
In a multilateral agreement decisions were unilateral. This anomaly 
is reflected in the South African decision to institute a purchase 
tax in 1969 wihtout consulting the other members of the union. This 
was done despite the fact that such a tax would have a serious impact 
on the economies and living standards in the BLS (Weisfelder 1972:134).
A new Customs Union Agreement was signed on December 11, 1969. This
purported to meet many of the objections put forward by the BLS.
Many concessions do appear in the 1969 agreement. Many attribute
these concessions to the South African government's "outward looking" 
12
foreign policy. This policy was designed to make friends in Africa 
due to continuing isolation of the Republic. These concessions, 
however, they may appear on paper, must be looked at with the 
disparities existing between the economies of the BLS and South Africa 
(discussed below).
The 1969 agreement as it appears, terminates the 1910 agreement and 
has as its main features as follows:
(a) With certain exceptions provided for within the agreement 
there should be free movement of goods within the customs area (Articles 
2 and 3).
(b) South African customs and tariff duties and sales duty 
should be applied to all goods imported into the area, and that there 
should be identical rebates, refunds or drawbacks on these duties 
(Article 4(1), (2) and (3).)
12 For a general discussion of the "Open Door"Policy.
See R.J. Southall "South Africa" in The Political Economy of African 
Foreign Policy ed. 1985; J. Barber South African Foreign Policy 
1945-1970, 1973; J.E. “Spence South African Foreign Policy: The
Outward Movement in Southern Africa in Perspective, 1972 ed.
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(c) The government of South Africa should give the other parties 
adequate opportunity for consultations before imposing, amending 
or abrogation any duties with respect to goods imported into the 
area (Article 15).
(d) The governments of the BLS may impose protective duties 
on goods imported into their area - whether from within the union 
or outside - in order to enable new industries to meet competition 
from other producers within the area, and that the party imposing 
such protective measures shall do so only after consultation with 
other members, and that such protective measures shall not be imposed 
for a period of more than eight years (Article 6).
(e) After specifying certain industries which are of potential 
importance to their economies, the BLS governments may be given 
"sympathetic consideration" by the South African government in terms 
of the non reduction of, and possible increase of tariffs on products 
in competition or the allowing of customs duty relief on any material 
inputs required for the specified industries (Article 7). Such non­
reduction, increases or relief shall be only for a specified period 
and the Government of South Africa may reduce or abrogate any excise 
duty applicable to goods produced by that industry which may be harmful 
to that industry (Article 9).
(f) All goods grown, produced or manufactured (as opposed to 
imported goods covered by Article 4) in the area should be subject 
to South African excise and sales duties (Article 8), and South African 
laws relating to customs, excise and sales duty should be adopted 
in the BLS (Article 10).
(g) Each party may maintain its own restrictions or prohibitions 
on the importation into or exportation from its area of any goods 
for economic, social, cultural or other reason (Article 11).
(h) The revenue from customs, excise, sales and any additional 
duties should be pooled and the BLS receive a share which is determined 
by a formula reflecting a percentage on the value of total goods
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imported, produced and consumed in each area; such percentage obtained 
plus a multiplying factor of 1.42 will thus represent each parties' 
share (Articles 13 and 14).
(i) There should, with exceptions of public policy or security 
considerations, be freedom of transit for imports or exports of any 
of the parties and transport rate discrimination is prohibited (Articles 
15 and 16).
(j) Should a party feel that exports from another party's area 
are being introduced into its area in increased quantities or in 
any other manner so as to cause or threaten serious injury to producers 
or manufacturers in its area, it should request consultations with 
the exporting partner so as to reach a "mutually acceptable solution" 
(Article 17).
(k) A party may not without the prior agreement of the other 
parties enter into a separate trade agreement with any other party 
which is outside the customs area which agreement allows for concessions 
on duties which are in force within the customs area (Article 19).
As can be seen this agreement provides for certain advantages to
the BLS countries, in particular the provision on the protection
of industries in their area. One would be tempted to conclude that
it is a fair agreement based on equitable ' sharing of revenues
enhanced by a multiplying factor intended to compensate for the
polarisation of the South African economy. However when one considers
that the BLS' exports are primarily agricultural or primary products
with industrial production playing a minor role in economic development
this conclusion becomes an illusionary vision of South African policy.
The disparities between the partners are reflected in the following
tables which should give one a rough idea of the products exported
L
and imported by each member and their relative incomes and payments.
Source: Arnold H. Isaacs Dependency Relations Betwen the BLS and
South Africa. •
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BOTSWANA
Imports in various categories of goods (in millions of Rands)
1973 1974
TOTAL 111,7 121,5
Vehicles 16,2 18,0
Mineral Oils 6,2 13,7
Steamboilers; machinery 17,5 9,7
Iron and Steel 9,2 8,3
Electrical Machinery 6,3 4,7
Clothes 3,1 4,7
Beverages 3,5 4,6
Meal products 4,2 4,0
Sugar and Sugar products 1,9 3,0
Paper 2,0 2,5
Furniture 1,8 2,2
Rubberware 1,4 2,1
Textile products other than Cloothing 1,1 2,0
Footwear 1,2 1,9
Cement and Building Material 1,8 1,7
Tobacco 1,3 1,6
Wood 1,2 1,7
Synthetic Yarns 1,1 1,4
Pharmaceutical products 1,1 1,3
Milk products 1,1 1,4
Soap 1,2 1,2
Coffee, Tea 0,9 1,1
Knitting 1,3 1,0
Spare Parts for Aeroplanes 0,3 1,4
(Source: "Exportmarkten": landengroep 12; 
bijlage II (a), p. 27)
III kwartaal 1977
Exports of various kinds of goods (in millions of Rands)
1973 1974
TOTAL 63,7 82,9
Mining Products 23,2 38,4
Meat and Meat Products 30,7 32,8
Hides, Skins 2,0 1,6
Animal Products etc.- 0,5 0,8
Other Products 7,3 9,3
(Source: "Exportmarkten": landengroep 12; III kwartaal 1977, 
bijalage II (b), p. 28)
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LESOTHO
Imports in various categories of goods (x R1 000)
1973 1974
TOTAL 67,962 84,702
Maize and Maize products 5,062 3,456
Livestock and products 16,014 16,202
Clothes 10,107 13,216
Machinery and Transport equipment 6,893 8,307
Blankets 4,302 6,652
Petroleum products 2,836 5,219
Chemical products 2,776 4,006
Footwear 2,415 3,591
Other products 17,557 24,053
(Source: "Exportmarkten"; landengroep 12; II kwartaal 1977
bijalge II (a), p. 80)
Exports in various categories of goods (x R1 000)
1973 1974
TOTAL 8,285 9,734
Livestock 1,998 1,526
Wool 3,190 3,452
Mohair 1,526 1,589
Diamonds 255 902
Other products 1,316 2,265
(Source: "Exportmarkten"; landengroep 12; II kwartaal 1977,
bijlage II (b), p. 80)
SWAZILAND
Exports of selected commodities, 1966-•1971 (x R1 000 000)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Forest products 8,2 6,9 7,3 9,3 12,3 12,4
Sugar 10,2 9,5 9,1 10,5 11,8 11,5
Iron Ore 8,5 10,0 9,0 9,6 11,0 12,2
Asbestos 5,0 5,8 6,0 6,2 5,2 5,6
Citrus Fruits 1,2 1,4 1,8 3,5 3,6 4,4
Meat and Meat Products 1,3 1,9 2,3 1,3 1,7 1,9
Other 4,0 4,7 3,8 4,1 4,6 6,8
38,4 40,2 39,3 44,5 50,2 54,8
(Source: Surveys of African Economies, Vol. 5, 1973
Table 26, jp. 219)
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Value of Imports by Commodity, 1968-1971 (x R1 000 000)
1968 1969 1970 1971
Food and Live Animals 4,1 5,0 4,8 4,6
Beverages and Tobacco 1.6 1,8 2,4 2,4
Crude Materials 0,4 0,7 0,5 0,7
Fuels and Lubricants 2,9 3,1 3,5 3,8
Edible Oils and Fats 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2
Chemicals 3,1 3,2 3,6 4,3
Manufactures and Materials 7,1 8,3 7,5 7,4
Machinery and Transport Equipment 10,0 9,2 11,2 13,0
Miscellaneous Manufactures 4,0 4,8 5,0 5,0
Other 0,7 1,1 4,0 4,7
34,1 37,4 42,7 46,1
(Source: Surveys of African Economies, 
Vol. 5, 1973 Table 28, p. 220)
SOUTH AFRICA
Imports into various categories of goods
(out of a total of 99) (x R1 000 000)
1975 1976
TOTAL 5.561,8 5.886,4
Organic Chemical Products 117,2 129,0
Various products for the Chemical Industry 100,6 107,3
Plastics 134,6 171,8
Paper, Carton and their Products 98,3 110,6
Synthetic Cloths etc. 75,4 116,3
Iron and Steel and their Products 405,5 213,4
Machinery etc. 1.287,3 1.298,3
Electrical Machinery 532,2 639,3
Cars, Tractors and other Vehicles 935,1 874,4
Aviation 78,7 290,4
Optical, Measure & Precision Instruments 155,1 157,7
(Source: "Exportmarkten” : landengroep 12;
bijlage III (a), pp. 36-38)
II kwartaal 1977,
Exports into various categories of goods
(out of a total of 96) (x R1 000 000)
1975 1976
TOTAL 3.989,6 4.500,7
Fruit 175,9 140,1
Grain 324,2 247,5
Sugar and Sugar products 288,5 215,2
Products from Vegetables and Fruit 105,1 135,3
Salt, Soil, Stone, lime, Cement etc. 138,6 194,4
Ores etc. 198,4 291,8
Fuels, Petroleum and their Products 51,2 112,0
Wool etc. 136,9 203,6
Pearls, Precious Stones and Metals 419,5 548,7
Coins 575,3 338,0
Iron and Steel and their Products 251,3 453,2
Copper and its Products 123,0 158,0
Nickel and its Products 62,4 104,4
Machinery etc. 111,3 112,8
Other Products 265,6 296,7
(Source: "Exportmarkten": landengroep 12; : 
bijlage III (b), pp. 39-41)
II kwartaal 1977,
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From these figures one can discern that the BLS are largely dominated 
by their partner's economic strength. It would thus be wrong to 
view the concessions to BLS industries as simply a ruse by South 
Africa to gain friends. South Africa's "outward" looking foreign 
policy was not merely an aim to gain the co-operation of African 
countries which were willing to swallow their distaste of its racial 
policies,
"The outward movement had major political-diplomatic 
and military-strategic objectives but had an underlying 
material basis in the requirement of South African based 
capital for increased resources, larger markets, expanding 
spheres for investment and maintenance of the existing 
supply of foreign migrant labour". (Southall p.233).
This factor representing an "underlying material basis" can be observed 
within the customs agreement. Even though articles 6 and 7 serve 
to provide for protection of BLS' industries, when read together 
with article 17 the advantages gained through these articles are 
somewhat diminished. Article 17 can be seen as an escape clause 
which protects South African industry. It effectively prevents BLS 
from setting up industries which are similar and are thus potentially 
competitive in regard to South African industries. The clause, 
therefore allows South Africa to wilfully destroy any chance of 
industrial growth in the BLS areas by simply preventing the establish­
ment of industries which are directly in competition with her own 
products. The pay-off under this arrangement is twofold in favour 
of South Africa, not only can it prevent similar industries being 
set up but it can also enjoy the benefit of importing from her 
"partners" products which do not necessarily prevent her own industries 
from finding, markets (Isaacs pp.32-37, Selwyn p.117-119). This
conclusion is borne out by the fact that by the time of the agreement 
(1969) South Africa already had a fully fledged manufacturing base 
covering most of the base industries necessary to an economy with 
BLS lagging far behind. This means that any attempt to establish an 
industry in these peripheral areas is doomed to failure
14 —  - —  —
For an interesting discussion on the failure of Lesotho to establish 
an . assembly plant for motor vehicles and attempts by Swaziland to 
establish a fertilizer plant see Isaacs pp.37-38.
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The agreement provides that there shall be "free interchange of goods 
in the region." Taken as read this implies that the BLS may not 
only export to and import goods from South Africa (or the international 
market) but may trade with each other. However this is not the case. 
They are compelled to trade with South Africa in the region not least 
because they are primary products exporters and thus need South Africa's 
refining facilities (Isaacs: 39) but also because the rail and transport 
system of Southern Africa runs from north to south and not east to 
west (Colclough p.10). South Africa therefore controls the 
distribution networks. The extent to which trade between the BLS
countries and South Africa has been entrenched is reflected in the
^  n - ,  • 15following figures.
Imports and Exports, 1976: Source Direction and Value (million US $)
Country Total
Exports
% going 
to region 
excl. RSA
% going 
to RSA
% going 
to rest of 
the world
Total
Imports
% from % from 
region RSA 
excl .RSA
% from 
rest of 
world
Botswana 176.15 9.1* 15.1 75.8 187.65 12.2* 81.4 6.4
Swaziland 193.66 0.8 20.1 79.1 135.25 0.7 87.4 11.9
Lesotho 16.9 0.6 89.9 9.5 177.30 - 94.4 5.6
Total 386.71 10.5 125.1 164.4 500.2 12.9 263.2 23.9
South Africa 8843.24 11.0 na 89.0 6736.69 4.3 na 95.7
Source: Calculated from trade matrix, presented in Economic Dependence
and Regional Co-operation, Sector paper prepared for the SADCC, Arusha, 
July 1979, Table 8, p.52 (mimeo).
Notes: *Mainly Zimbabwe
These figures show not only a lack of direct trade links between
the BLS countries but a marked dependence on South African products 
which account for an average 90 per cent of their total imports. 
For Lesotho the situation is worse, being geographically surrounded 
by South Africa, it not only exports the relatively minimal goods 
it produces to South Africa, it is also chronically dependent on
South African products whose value far outstrip its revenue from
exports. This means that for revenue it is hugely dependent on the
migratory labour it exports to South African mines.
Reproduced in Botswana's Economy Since Independence 1983 ed. p.11.
It is plain to see that for South Africa the BLS forms an adequate 
market for its goods, a market which finds institutional protection 
in the customs union agreement. Put another way, within international 
capitalist relations where the powerful producers (inc'l. S.A.) are 
in direct competition with each other for markets, South Africa has 
a haven in her backyard where her products are not met by international 
competition. This all points to the benefits of a strong economy, 
a regional hegemony which allows South Africa to dictate the terms 
of trade.
On the issue of consultation the agreement provides (Article 20) 
for a Customs Union Commission. The commission is supposed to meet 
once a year for "the purpose of discussing any matter arising out 
of this agreement". It comprises representatives of all the contracting 
parties. Its powers are limited to using its "best endeavours to 
find a mutually agreeable solution to the particular problem or 
difficulty". Upon discussion the representatives are requested to 
report to their respective governments with the view that "remedial 
measures" will be considered by the governments. As we have seen 
one of the major complaints by the BLS in relation to the 1910 agreement 
was the fact that South Africa could take unilateral decisions without 
consulting its partners. Article 20 was supposed to remedy this 
deficiency. Looking at the almost non-existent powers of the commission 
one is bound to be sceptical; the commission has absolutely no powers 
of enforcement except to recommend to respective governments with 
a view that such governments will undertake to remedy the "matter". 
Given the power of South Africa it is doubtful that it will agree 
to take measures which it views as detrimental to its economic position 
when requested to do so by its weaker partners. In actuality if 
Article 30 which provided that South Africa will give the other partners 
adequate opportunity to consult before it imposes, amends or abrogates 
any customs duty, is invoked by the BLS countries not only can these 
countries not enforce a decision under the consultation clause, the 
agreement itself provides South Africa with a broad escape clause 
under paragraph 2 of Article 5. This provides that 5(1) shall not 
be applicable:
"if the imposition of, or the removal of, or an amendment to 
any customs duty either forms part of the measures of the 
government of South Africa designed primarily for fiscal
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purposes, or is resorted to as an interim measure designed
to assist a local industry in the customs and pending the
completion of an investigation by the appropriate South 
African authorities".
Who determines what are fiscal purposes is not provided for and 
naturally it must be assumed that it is the government of South 
Africa, just as it decides what necessitates interim measures. However 
the point is that not only does the clause act as an escape clause but 
it further strengthens the thesis that the agreement is in itself 
wholly unequal. This is further evidenced by the fact that under 
Africle 10 the BLS countries are obligated to apply South African laws
with respect to customs, excise and sales duty thus not allowing for
the formation of indigenous rules relating to trade in general.
That trade with countries outside the union is severely affected by 
Article 19 is provided by the fact the' BLS, being parties to the 
ACP-EEC Lome convention, are allowed to export goods duty free into the 
EEC, but because of this article, they cannot enjoy duty free imports 
from the EEC. Further, the article limits the amounts of trade between 
the BLS and other countries further north on the sub-continent as they 
cannot give fabourable terms to products outside the area. Article 
19 also restricts the ability of BLS to participate fully as equal 
partners in the treaty for the Establishment of the Preferential Trade 
Area for Eastern and Southern Africa States; see particularly Article 
3(4)(a)(xii) and Annex XII; "Protocol Relating to the Unique Situation 
of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland". This treaty is reproduced in 
1982 I.L.M. p. 479. So that despite having trade links with other 
centres, the BLS are cocooned in an assidously asphyxiating agreement 
which ensures that South Africa collects on all fronts.
The issue of restrictive measures on trade links with other peripheral 
states on the sub-continent brings us directly to the pertinent 
question; with their sovereignty compromised by events beyond their 
control what steps are being taken by the BLS to secure their economic 
independence from South Africa. It is this question to which we must 
now turn in the third part of this paper.
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Conclusion
This part of the paper has charted (a) the development of capitalism 
in South Africa (b) its rise to become a dominant centre in the Southern 
African periphery (c) the creation of dependency links between South 
Africa and the BLS states, and (d) the institutionalisation of these 
dependence links through the Customs Union Agreement. What has therefore 
been seen is the use of purportedly legitimate means by a powerful 
state to perpetuate chronic dependence links with its weaker neighbours.
As a general conclusion to this study Part III will seek to identify 
the cause of action to be taken to eliminate the dependence links.
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PART III
Economic Independence - an attainable goal?
(i) Introduction
This part of the paper will serve as a conclusion of the discussion 
undertaken in Part II. That is, the issues raised here will seek to 
find an answer to the question of eliminating dependence. The method 
chosen will not only concentrate on Southern Africa but will also pursue 
a discussion of the response of the Third World in general to the issue 
of economic independence. Such a general overview of collective action 
is imperative when seeking to address the issue of the role of the BLS 
acting in concert with other states to eliminate dependency; not least 
because the BLS states are international actors in their own right.
However, before undertaking such a task one must be aware that the issue
of economic independence is a wideranging one. It is one which has been 
tackled across the whole range of the social science disciplines. For 
our discussion the questions pertaining to economic independence shall be 
tackled using the political-economic format and international law; 
international law because the major focus will be on organisation which 
presupposes the existence of rules of both the procedural and sub­
stantive forms and this in turn involves the law since the law is pre­
eminently about rules. The use of law as a basis of analysis will, how­
ever, be limited by the fact that it is political-economic events which 
dictate the formation of organisations and thus the rules which accompany
organisations. It is also true that enforcement of rules in the inter­
national arena is not dictated by the requirements of an international 
legal order but by the political order which allows nation states to 
behave in a manner largely dictated by their interest; be they collective 
or individual interests.
The organisation must therefore be seen as a vehicle through which states 
seek representation and fulfillment of their interests. This is a point 
mentioned in the first part of the paper. It was through the use of
1 Johan Galtung’s theory of imperialism.
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organisations that the Western world was able to legitimise its overall 
dominance just as it is through an organisation that South Africa maintains 
crippling dependence relations with the BLS.
Thus one of the factors presented by Johan Galtung's theory is the ability 
of peripheral states to counter economic domination by centre states 
through collective action. For purposes of our present study this has 
been initiated by Southern African states through the formation of the 
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) whose avowed 
goal is the elimination of the economic dependence of the member states.
It is this organisation which will be at the centre of the discussion 
since the goal here is to try and seek answers to the question of depend­
ence links between the BLS and South Africa.
However a study of SADCC cannot be undertaken in isolation since its member 
states do make up part of a wider spectrum of states engaged in similar 
struggles. It is also of importance to note that the formation of SADCC 
was partly as a result of these wider struggles being played out on the 
international fora such as the United Nations>resulting in more con­
centrated effort at the continental and regional levels. For these reasons 
an outline of the efforts made at the United Nations with particular 
emphasis on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) 
and the New International Economic Order (NIEO) shall be given. At the 
continental level focus will be on the efforts of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU).
The format chosen is first a discussion of the U.N. efforts which will 
serve to give a wider picture of the structural analysis. The O.A.U. 
will then be considered. Lastly the structure of SADCC will be given.
It is not the aim here to look at the organisational functions of the 
organisations (with the exception of SADCC) but rather to focus upon 
whether or not there is reason to believe that collective action can 
succeed given the adoption of strategies for economic independence within 
these organisations.
(ii) Economic Independence: A Global Consensus?
It was in the early 1960's that the decolonisation process touched Africa. 
This was to result in the largest influx of states becoming members of the 
United Nations. For centuries the so called dark continent's population 
had been pawns in other peoples designs. Now they were being recognised 
as human beings worthy of membership in the international community. 
Together with other deprived nations Africans were being given the 
opportunity to become players rather than mere pawns in global affairs.
A transition was taking place at the United Nations. The custodians 
of world security were being asked to pass some of their global influence 
to these new states. A new generation of nations, born in this present 
century and hardened by a long and bitter deprivation, were bent on 
revising the agenda of world order; a world order shaped by the powerful 
and designed to deprive the majority of their rights to share in global 
wealth.
Third world influence in global affairs was to be initiated in that all 
embracing body, the United Nations. It presented the new international 
actors with the only forum which truly recognised their right to voice 
their grievances and partake in the decisions affecting their interests. 
The U.N. General Assembly provided the means through which the third 
world states could seek to counter the assymetrical economic relations 
(discussed in Part I) existing between them and the industrialised 
nations of the West. It was through the General Assembly that inter­
national economic community relations entered a new phase; the phase 
when the third world declared its intention to overturn the existing 
international economic order and replace it with a new one.
On May 9, 1974 the General Assembly adopted the declaration on the
2
Establishment of a New International Economic Order and in December of
the same year adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
3
States. These resolutions laid down not only the demands of the third 
world but, together with the Programme of action on the Establishment of 
a New International Economic Order (GA Res. 3202 (S-Vi) 1974 ILM p270), 
consist of a series of principles and rules relating to the establish­
ment of a new order.
*2 GA Res/3201 (S-Vi) 1974 I.L.M. p.715).
*3 GA Res/3281 (XXIX) Brownlie Basic Doc. p.235 3rd ed.
Resolution 3201 states that the new order must be based on "equity", 
sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation 
amongst all states irrespective of their economic and social systems", 
and that it "shall correct inequalities, and redress existing injustices", 
and "make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed 
and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic 
and social development and peace and justice for present and future r 
generations." The principles upon which the declaration is founded range 
from the sovereign equality of states, self determination of all peoples, 
broad cooperation, right to nationalise as an expression of sovereignty, 
regulating the activities of multinationals,just and,equitable pricing of 
primary products, strengthening collective self reliance among developing 
countries to the promotion of producers' associations.
The Program of Action then identifies the various international economic 
sectors in which effort must be made to redress the severe economic im­
balance in the relations between the developed and developing countries. 
Through Article VI of the Program of Action the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States then lays down the broad rules which will regulate 
the establishment of the.NIEO.
The fundamental legal question which must be answered is, do the 
instruments provide us with a regulatory procedure which can or should 
ensure adherence by the community of states? To find an answer one must 
turn to the ongoing debate about whether or not General Assembly 
resolutions have legal effect, that is, is the General Assembly capable 
of making law to regulate the behaviour of States. There are various 
views offered by international jurists on this issue; there are those who 
maintain that General Assembly resolutions are binding on member states of 
the U.N. and those who assert that even though these resolutions may have 
some legal impact they are not capable of creating law. The crux of the 
issue is thus on the norm-creating function of the General Assembly.
The first view, on the binding nature of resolutions, is demonstrated by 
the PATNA DECLARATION adopted by international jurists from India and 
Nepal which declares in' part,
"that the resolution of the General Assembly-
passed by more than three fourth majority of
membership be treated as enunciating a
4
principle of international law."
This is a wide and perhaps too extreme an interpretation of the powers 
accorded the General Assembly by the U.N. Charter which under Article 10 
empowers it to "discuss" and make "recommendations." However some jurists 
have tended to bypass Article 10 and bring the debate into the ambit of 
the creation of binding obligation under certain circumstances. For 
example Professor Ingrid Delipus writes that:
"It is true that resolutions of the General 
Assembly are binding when they repeat rules 
which exist in customary international law..." 
(International Law and the Independent State 
p.13).
de Arechaga asserts "These Declarations may constitute a source of rules of 
international law in a way similar to the formation of a consesus in 
conferences for the codification and progressive development of inter­
national law." ((159) Recueil des Cours 1978 p.31). If this is the 
process through which a resolution may be recognised as forming a norm of 
international customary law then it would be difficult to grant customary 
law status to the NIE0 or CERDS.
Taking Professor Delipus* view that resolutions are binding when they
repeat rules which already exist in customary law it may be enlightening
to point out what constitutes a customary rule is still a matter of great
5
debate among jurists. de Arechaga*s assertion on codification is 
worth further consideration. Brownlie suggests that the process of 
codification is "the setting down, in a comprehensive and ordered form, 
of rules of existing law and the approval of the resulting text by a law 
determining agency", (Principles of Public International Law p.31). If 
this definition is taken as a true representation of codification then it 
would be extremely difficult to claim that the General Assembly is a "law 
determining agency " . It is generally agreed that what constitutes law 
determining agencies in terms of the sources of international law are
4 Reproduced in "International Law through United Nations" edited by R.C. 
Hingorani p.201.
5 See Carty "Decay of International Law", 1986 at pp.25-26.
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judicial decisions and the teachings of highly qualified jurists (Article 
38(1)(d) of the Statute of the World Court).
Given that the principles embodied in Resolution 3201 and the rules in the 
CERDS were not unanimously adopted at the U.N. their validity as 
authoratitive principles and rules becomes even more doubtful. The 
Western industrialised states to whom the demands enshrined in these 
instruments were directed, accepted as general principles most of what is 
contained in Resolution 3201 but made certain reservations, particularly 
as regards the clauses of article 4(e) and (f). These clauses are the 
ultimate expression of the sovereignty of the State over its natural 
resources and economic activities. Article 4(e) describes the rights of 
the State to exercise"effective control, exploit, nationalise and transfer 
ownership to its national^1 as inalienable and that the right to national­
ise is an expression of "the full permanent sovereignty of the State." 
Article 4(f) provides that where there has been "foreign occupation, alien 
or colonial domination or apartheid" the State is entitled to full 
compensation and restitution for all resources exploited and depleted.
As regards 4(f) Britain was quite emphatic that it could not accept the 
formulation. Rejecting both 4(e) and (f) Mr Richards the British 
representative stated:
"We do not ... interpret the Declaration as 
in any way affecting international obligations 
in relation to States' sovereignty over natural 
resources, nor do we accept the apparent 
obligation for compensation referred to in 
paragraph 4(f) (1974 ILM pp.763-764).
On the question of permanent sovereignty over natural resources the U.S. 
delegate could not find the formulation under paragraph 4(e) acceptable on 
the grounds that it "does not couple the assertion of the right to 
nationalize with the duty to pay compensation in accordance with inter­
national law" (1974 ILM p.746).
This rejection by the industrialised Western States of what may be con­
sidered a vital expression of economic sovereignty was dealt the second 
blow when the General Assembly voted on the adoption of the CERDS. This
was adopted by a majority vote of 120 in favour, 6 against (Belgium, 
Denmark, West Germany, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, United States), and 10 
abstentions. Again the contentious issue involved the question of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the right of the state 
to dispose of its resources in a manner which suits its development needs 
and provide compensation according to its domestic law (Article 2(2)(C) 
CERDS). Without going too much into the intricate arguments for and 
against compensation for nationalised property it will suffice to show 
that the Western States adhere to certain standards when it is their 
interests which are at stake.
Traditionally, when there was no effective opposition to the formulation 
of rules of customary law, the interference by the State with foreign 
owned property was regarded as a violation of acquired rights. However 
by 1962 the rules were changed with the majority of states claiming it a 
right to nationalise property in accordance with domestic law. It was 
conceded under Resolution 1803 (XVII)(Brownlie p.23) that "appropriate" 
compensation would be paid. This vague formulation (appropriate com­
pensation) was of course open to wide interpretation with the Western 
States arguing that the correct interpretation should be "adequate, prompt 
and effective compensation11. This argument was carried forth to the 
negotiations over the CERDS Article 2(2)(c) with the Western States' 
rejection of the whole Charter after a failed amendment. Article 2(2)(c) 
was seen: (a) as a total rejection of internatinal law with respect to 
nationalised foreign owned property and (b) as a means by which to cir­
cumvent international obligation and base the issue of compensation wholly 
on subjectivity (de Arechaga pp.302-303).
With respect to these criticisms Jimenez de Arechaga points out that under 
international law the formulation of 2(2)(c) is a legitimate one. Under 
the local remedies rule national law and local remedies have to be ex­
hausted before resort to international measures; international law 
provides that "a state may take up the case of its national and make a 
claim on its behalf", and this right is not precluded by the Charter 
(de Arechaga pp.303-304).
If therefore the true motive behind the industrialised countries' rejection 
was not the exclusion of international regulation what was it? It is
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difficult to find an answer based within the confines of international law. 
However one could look at new forms of regulating foreign investment, 
particularly at the bilateral investment treaty. The bilateral investment 
treaty seeks to establish a lex specialis between two parties with a view 
to creating a mutual regime of investment protection. The features of 
these treaties do show that regulation is two-way. However when one 
considers the fact that they are generally entered into between an 
industrialised state on the one hand and a developing state on the other, 
the effect of protection is one sided; it is the industrialised state 
which is the exporter of capital to the developing nation and as such it 
is the industrialised states' investment which is really being protected.
The fact that they are a recent phenomenon of international relations 
must attract the view that they are intended to create special relation­
ships intended to circumvent customary rules of international law (see 
M. SORNARAJAH State Responsibility and Bilateral Investment Treaties pp. 
80-83). It is worth noting that the refusal of Western States to accept 
the fact that the majority of nations do not adhere to their traditional 
norms of customary law in relation to state responsibility for foreign in­
vestment means that the development of new rules is diversely affected.
The creation of lex specialis regimes provides them with the ammunition 
needed to bypass the expressed view of the majority. The conclusion 
reached therefore must be that as long as international law and in 
particular the formulation of new customary rules, runs against their 
interests they will not accept it. This statement is not designed to mean 
that the principles enshrined in the NIE0, which these states have 
rejected, are now customary law. However it is very difficult to believe 
in the traditional sources of international law when the views of the over­
whelming majority of states counts for nought in the face of a handful of 
powerful states' dissent. There is no international lawyer who would 
justly disagree that had the dissenting view come from a handful of states 
belonging to relatively poorer members of the international community their 
dissent would count for nought in terms of blocking the formation of a 
new customary rule.
That international law has failed to regulate the behaviour of states with 
regard to foreign investment cannot be doubted. The basis of regulation
initiated in the General Assembly through consensual procedure seems to 
have failed the emergent states. The NIEO and CERDS were based on a naive 
faith in the ability of rules to alter global patterns of wealth dis­
tribution and economic activities. There seems to have been no realisation 
that law itself is not neutral or value free. Without acknowledging the 
balance of power relations and the huge economic power exercised by multi­
nationals which is tied up to world capitalist trade, it is extremely 
difficult to derive binding rules to regulate economic activities. Some
international lawyers have argued for the implementation of the NIEO under
*7
the ambit of human rights, expressly the right to development. The 
problem faced by the human rights argument is that (it is agreed that the 
right to development is one which involves states as the main par­
ticipants) it has to establish the source of this right. Rose D'sa 
resorts to the argument that the NIEO is the vehicle through which this 
right is expressed. She however falls into the sterile argument (dis­
cussed above) for recognition of General Assembly Resolutions as binding 
and thus giving legal effect to this right (D’sa pp.143-144).
Broadly defined the right to development goes beyond economics or 
resources; "it extends to the maximisation of happiness via the en­
hancement of life and life possibilities for the individual, whatever his 
or her status or position in life11 (Allott p.6). The underprivileged of 
the world are the holders of this right and it is the duty of governments 
to implement it. This view by Allott seems to be based on utilitarian 
principles which again do not consider the reality of the international 
order. If the industrialised nations are the duty holders how are they to 
be compelled to share the global wealth? Paul Brietzke adopts a more 
pragmatic approach by saying that it is only through international con- 
sesus that this right can be implemented (p.27). However such inter­
national consesus is hardly likely given that the industrialised states 
emphasize political and civil rights whilst developing states look to 
social, economic,and cultural rights as those paramount to them. Thus the 
case for the right to development is not effective for progress towards 
economic independence at the moment. It is beset by the problem that the
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*7 See for example Brietzke “Development as a Human Rite” p.25-27; D ’sa 
R. “The Right to Development and the NIEO with Special Reference to 
Africa" pp.140-144; Allot, A. “Development for What? - False Gods and 
Holy Writ", pp.1-8.
holders of the correlative duties and rights have no common ground upon 
which to found a basis for implementing human rights in general.
Does this then mean that we have to dismiss the NIEO as impractical or 
are there other avenues through which it can be channelled to give rise 
to implementation? A striking feature of the NIEO is that it purports to 
be "new" and the demands inherent within it are supposedly geared towards 
transforming the present world economic order. Is it in fact "new11 and 
does it constitute demands which are no more than pliant requests for the 
greater integration of third world economies into the Western dominated 
world capitalist economy? If credence can be lent to the demands of the 
NIEO, is there any justification in the criticism that it is in fact a 
rhetorical rebellion of the third world based upon a modern mythology of 
change? These pertinent questions must be answered if we are to find 
answers to whether the NIEO is a credible means towards a transition from 
dependency to the ability to control the economic destiny of the dependent 
state.
The Brandt Commission has tried to answer the second question by outlining 
strategies which it believes are necessary for the eradication of in­
equalities in the international economic order. The fundamental argument 
used is that the changes it suggests are in effect a promotion of "mutual 
interests" arising out of the increasing interdependence in international 
affairs (Brandt Commission Papers pp.395-402). The argument is pursued 
through a perusal of selected issues designed to exhibit that necessary 
economic adjustments are beneficial to both North and South in the short 
and long term (pp.403-416). Those covered are "energy and environment"; 
"food and agriculture"; "transnational corporations"; "migrant labour 
and brain drain"; "access to markets for manufacture and industrialisation" 
"commodities"; "debt, financial flows and the international monetary 
system." The Commission does not attempt to give concrete proposals for 
the realisation of this "mutual interests" strategy. What it attempts is 
to outline broad proposals whose effectivity seems to depend upon a 
psychological reversal of the industrialised countries' economic policies. 
For example on the question of energy the Commission proposes that,
"the industrial countries should reduce the 
energy intensity of their own growth and make 
particular efforts to conserve world-wide 
petroleum supplies." (Commission Papers p.404).
This would mean that the industrialised countries should economise on 
their energy consumption and thus reduce output in industries which are 
heavily dependent on energy resources. This strategy, aimed at the 
industrialised states, is coupled with the suggestion that the less 
developed states should conserve their traditional energy resources and 
deyelop new forms. The first proposal seems to be largely impractical in 
that the Commission does not consider the fact that proposals aimed at 
governments do not necessarily mean that the real consumers of energy (the 
industries) have nothing to gain in such proposals; a capitalist economy 
is geared towards the maximisation of capital accumulation and energy plays 
a crucial role in this respect. Again the proposals on the role of TNC's 
in development seem to lack any realistic approach. The Commission 
suggests that the TNC’s, "can bring to developing countries investment 
capital, technology, management and marketing skills" (p.407). Therefore 
they are a "potential force for develoment." The Commission accepts that 
transfer pricing, overpricing of technology through oligopolistic 
behaviour, distortion of technological choice, excessive or rapid ex­
ploitation of natural resources, distortion of wage and consumption 
patterns and interference through unfair competition among other things, 
limitations in know-how transfer and training of locals, the balance of 
payments effects of profit repatriation, taxation effects, political and 
economic interference are just some of the ill effects TNC’s have on 
domestic economies. Despite this, the Commission seems to have an almost 
naive belief that there is, in their own words, "a very substantial mutual 
interest", in "harnessing the economic strength and experience of TNC's 
for development" (pp.407-408). The Commission does not undertake a study 
of the ideological dimension of international capital transfer. Despite the 
fact that the TNC's are an integral part of the expansion of capital on a 
global scale, most of the capital involved still has a national 
(metropolis) base in terms of its origin and its control. Most capital 
exports are between the developed countries and since the nationalisations 
of oil, this is all the more so true. The capital which is exported to
the developing countries does require that the host state gives political, 
military and economic support. With reference to Africa this support is 
provided by the local capitalist class which controls the state apparatus. 
If suggestions that the TNC's are to play a concrete role in develop­
ment - meaning here the enhancement of the majority's economic, social 
and cultural prospects - are to be taken seriously the role of the social 
forces within the state receiving foreign investment via the TNC's must 
be assessed. The Commission does not seek to do this. It leaves open the 
internal role of the peripheral capitalist state and emphasises instead 
the hope that, through the NIEO - respect for sovereign equality - 
"attitudes, policies and procedures towards foreign investment in develop­
ing countries are likely to become progressively more 'positive' only if 
an atmosphere of trust and confidence is generated in the host country - 
TNC - home country relationships" (Commission Papers p.546).
There is a long list of issues tackled by the Brandt Commission which 
includes proposals on the reform of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (pp.509-529) and the restructuring of the international monetary 
system (pp.567-706). These proposals are just that "proposals" which so 
far have been met with little, if any, implementation that has shown no 
signs of benefitting the developing countries. If anything, the 
international order has gone into further disarray with no prospects for 
peace in the middle-east, famine of horrific dimensions in Africa, debt 
crisis in Latin America. The situation is summed up by Shridath.
S. Ramphal, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth,
"... As we turn toward the end of the century, 
the outlook is challenging almost beyond belief.
It is as if a whole series of man-made disasters 
threaten our planet like tides rolling over us: 
tides of economic chaos that leave many a country 
struggling with social disintegration and political 
turmoil as economic conditions deteriorate: tides 
of human deprivation and misery that leave starvation 
and death in their wake and shame on common humanity: 
tides of anti-internationalism that batter the 
structures of international cooperation built 
patiently, and with sacrifice; tides of militarism
that imply a recrudescence of power and 
authoritarianism in our global society; and tides 
of arbitrariness and indifference to principle 
that erode the foundations of world order and 
make a virtue of extremism." (The Third World:
a Look Before and After pp.58-59).
The only relief seems to come from "band-aid" type treatments which seek 
to herald a rejuvination of world awareness, an awareness false in its 
implications as the role of the exporters of capital is hardened by 
tightened monetary policies, stricter barriers on international trade and 
lower commodity prices.
What, therefore, are the reasons for the failure of the NIEO? Or to 
return to the question asked above, is it really new or is it an attempt 
by the third world to attain greater integration into the world capitalist 
economy? On the political front it is hard to imagine why the political 
representatives at the United Nations should have presented a united front
in the face of wide ranging proposals designed to integrate them into the
capitalist world order. These states have diverse attitudes towards the 
philosophy and method of development-ranging from China's internal (as it was) 
socialist program to Brazil's export substitution oriented capitalist 
policies. Did the euphoria of presenting a united front blind the third 
world to the impracticalities of their demands? The question on whether 
the NIEO is in fact a "new" set of proposals is summarised in an answer 
given by Roy Prieswerk:
"Most surprising in what has actually been said 
are the number of proposed measures which are 
geared towards an intensification of existing 
economic relations. An entirely outward-looking 
concept of development is adopted: increased 
trade, more rapid transfers of technology, 
higher amounts of financial aid and better technical 
assistance. All the methods of 'improvement1 put 
forward by the third world for the transformation 
of the world economy are geared towards a greater 
integration of their countries into a system that
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looks very similar to the present one."
(Hidden Dimensions of the So-Called New Inter­
national Economic Order p.35).
Prieswerk exposes the hidden dimension of "initiative development" which 
suggests that the third world more or less consciously were negotiating 
"to create societies resembling those of the supposed enemy." This 
involves a psychological dimension through which a process of "mental 
self-colonisation" is induced when faced with a model of the industrialized 
state. This brings us back to the issues discussed in Part I of this 
paper. It seems that the politicians of the third world did not reject
d
(as did political-economists) modernisation theory. Johan Galtung 
cynically observes that,
"First the NIEO is essentially trade oriented; 
there is even talk of expanding the world economy ...
Second, as far as improving world trade is 
concerned NIEO only aims at terms of trade.
There is very little mention of changing the 
division of labour .. Third, to the extent that 
there is talk of improved terms of trade it is the 
deterioration in terms of trade that is discussed ..
not the absolute level ... Fourth, to the extent
that there is some talk of improvement of labour 
it centres on such tertiary sector institutions 
as transportation, insurance and finance institutions 
in general ... To summarize what the New Inter­
national Economic Order means, when translated into 
world reality, is some kind of 'capitalism for 
everybody charter' (Galtung 1975, cited in 
Frank Rhetoric and Reality of the NIEO p.172).
This suggests that the NIEO has its foundations in a global con­
frontation between the international capitalist on the one hand and the 
peripheral capitalist who no1 longer wants to remain at the "margin" or 
"outside" but seeks to belong within the world capitalist system and
participate in the decisions influencing its development.
With their proliferation into the world community of states, the develop­
ing countries seem to have embarked on a course which "remains to today a 
collection of rhetorical demands which the powerful have simply brushed 
aside. Talks of sovereign equality became mere statements of what could 
be. Equality was attained where it counted least; the General Assembly of 
the United Nations. Where it matters most it is still the industrialised 
Western States who are in control. The security council and specialised 
agencies are still largely controlled by the West. The World Bank and the 
IMF are U.S. and to some extent West European controlled. It is now 
apparent that the West is not willing to relinquish its hold over the 
world's wealth. It has also become apparent that without concurrent 
political change in the world order there will be no economic change. The 
rules of international law cannot dictate change in policy; it is only 
through a political transformation that new rules able to regulate the 
economic behaviour of states in a just and equal basis will emerge. The 
failure of international law to provide protection for the third world 
within a capitalist world system does put grave doubts on the viability 
of international law. It lends credibility to the almost contemptuous 
attitude of political scientists that international economic legalism only 
provides a convenient reference point for what to do in the absence of 
contrary interests (see Tarullo p.534). Much of the problem lies in the 
inability of international law to provide new means for the creation of 
new rules designed to put right the inequalities existing between the 
first and third worlds. One of the basic problems is that of sovereign 
equality. The NIEO has much of its demands based upon a notion that all 
states are equal and therefore should share equally in the wealth of the 
world.
Western international legal theory has attempted to put into focus this 
claim of equality. Here we shall look at the eminent jurist Hans Kelsen 
in order to explore the mysterious nature of the concept of sovereign 
equality. Kelsen denies first of all the existence of lacunae in inter­
national law: "If there is no norm of conventional or customary inter­
national law impsoing upon the state ... the obligation to behave in a 
certain way, the subject is under international law legally free to behave 
as it pleases ..." (Principles pp.438-439). Kelsen's words reflect the 
nature of behavioural patterns on the international fora. It essentially
means, for our purposes, that the powerful states can disregard any rules 
aimed at an equitable distribution of the world's resources on the grounds 
that they do not form part of international law. This, for example, was
the attitude taken by the U.S. delegate at the negotiations for the
adoption of the NIEO resolutions with respect to the issue of national­
isation (discussed above).
Kelsen, of course, is not a believer in a multidisciplinary approach to 
law. In his famous work, Pure Theory of Law, he seeks to purify the law 
by keeping it free from all foreign elements such as morality and politics. 
He asserts that the distinguishing factor between the legal order and 
other social orders is that the legal order is a Zwangsordnung, a coercive
order. Thus coercion or the possibility of sanctions which can be
applied forcibly in the case of commission of a delict, is the decisive 
criterion of a legal order (Kelsen "Principles pp.3-5 Kooijmans p.163). 
Kelsen applies this critereon to international law and comes to the 
conclusion that there are in fact international delicts because there are 
also international sanctions that can be applied in the case of such a 
delict namely reprisals and war (Principles pp.18-19). The cohesiveness 
and exclusivity of the legal order is compounded by the fact that a legal 
norm, and its validity can be traced back to a "higher" norm from whence 
the legal norm in question derives its authority. This theorising based 
upon a purely personal and speculative formal-logical analysis dismisses 
any material origins of human or state behaviour. The consequences of 
Kelsen's reasoning brings into derision ideas of the sovereign equality 
of states. If individual states can behave in any manner which suits 
them as long as there is no threat of legal sanction then the idea of 
sovereign equality has no place in the international legal order. It is 
the traditional rule of the sovereignty of individual states which counts. 
Any material foundation of a principle of sovereign equality must be dis­
missed as it cannot be traced to any higher norm and in fact may be said 
to be a contradiction of the supremacy of the state. According to Kelsen 
"if general international law provides for coercive acts as sanctions, the 
states concerned are authorised t o ’execute them or, as this aspect of the 
principle of self-help is characterised, to take the law into their own 
hands" (Principles p.20). Equality in the law does not exist according 
to Kelsen. States are: "equal in so far as general international law
treats them this way, that is, insofar as general international law 
imposes upon all of them the same duties and confers upon all of them the 
same rights" (Principles pp.247-248). However some privileges are con­
ferred by law on certain states which privileges are not shared by other 
states. Kelsen points to treaties which he says grant some privileges and 
excludes others. Taking the example of the United Nations he states:
"The Charter of the United Nations confers upon 
five great powers the privilege of the so-called 
veto right, without violating the principle of 
equality allegedly established by general inter­
national law. And in spite of the legal inequality 
of states under the Charter, the latter proclaims 
in its Article 2(1): 'The Organisation is based 
on the principle of the sovereign equality of 
all its Members.1 It is evidently not equality 
in the law, but equality before the law which is 
meant by the right of equality attributed by juris­
prudence to individuals as well as to states, 
in spite of the fact that men as well as states 
are in fact not equal." (Principles p.248).
On the question of sovereignty itself Kelsen dismisses the idea that it 
can be the basis upon which norms of international law are formed. It 
is a legal concept which means that a state, "must be subordinated only 
to international law, and not to the national law of another state"
(p.249), and on equality; "It is sin illusion to believe that legal rules 
can be derived from a concept such as sovereignty or any other legal 
concept. Legal rules are valid only if they are created by legislation, 
custom or treaty; and the legal rules constituting the so-called equality 
of states are valid not because the states are sovereign, but.because these 
rules are norms of positive international law" (Kelsen The Principle of 
Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organisation
p.210).
What Kelsen asserts, though in a highly abstract manner, is true; there 
is no such thing as the sovereign equality of states. However, the manner 
in which he approaches the issue of sovereignty is not realistic. To
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opine that states are subordinate to international law is to neglect the 
historical dimension of state behaviour. One of the fundamental 
principles of the U.N. Charter is the non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of the member states of the U.N. It is not the place here to deal 
with the numerous instances - there is a wealth of literature on the 
subject - when powerful states have intervened in the domestic affairs of 
other weaker states; the most blatant violation of international law by 
the United States in recent times was its invasion of the small Carribbean 
island of Grenada. That sovereignty means the non-applicability of the 
national laws of one state in another may be true. However it is the most 
powerful state in the world which has enacted laws -antitrust legis­
lation - which affect the domestic laws of other states. Maybe what 
Kelsen should have said was that the powerful states are those capable 
of sanctioning but are themselves not subject to any reprisals for 
violations of international norms.
To summarise: we have looked at the NIEO as being a set of demands 
supposedly aimed at a more just and equitable international economic 
order. These demands adopted by the General Assembly of the U.N. as 
resolutions we found to have absolutely no legal effect. A political- 
economic approach was then adopted which looked at the work of the Brandt 
Commission. This approach led to the conclusion that there is really 
nothing new about the NIEO except that it is an outline of proposals for 
the greater participation of the third world in the already existing 
international capitalist economic order. It was also discovered that the 
NIEO bypasses fundamental questions on the socio-political structures of 
the actors of the international community. Lastly it was observed that 
the basic principle upon which the NIEO is founded, "sovereign equality of 
states", is more a fiction than a reality; that international law, even 
in its traditional positivist form does not give credibility to the 
arguments for action based on notions of sovereign equality.
What has been said, in short, is that the NIEO is a set of rhetorical 
statements which never had or have much hope of implementation. What 
therefore, is the alternative? One of the proposals of the NIEO has been 
that of collective self-reliance. This proposal, unlike the many others, 
is not a demand aimed at the industriali*sed countries but would find
effect within the development strategies adopted by the third world 
countries. For purposes of this paper we look at the efforts at 
collective self-reliance in Southern Africa.
(iii) Regional Co-operation: A Viable Alternative?
The idea of collective self-reliance is not new to African States. As early 
as 1960 independent African States recognised the need for collective action 
as a means to prevent new forms of colonialism. At the Second Conference 
of Independent States 1960, the heads of government recommended that: 
"independent African States should consider the possibility of introducing 
a system whereby economic and technical aid can be provided by them 
collectively". (Resolution reproduced in Brownlie. Basic Documents on 
Human Rights, p. 422. 2nd ed.). This was later broadened in the O.A.U. 
Charter whose article 2 provides, inter alia, that the O.A.U.'s purposes 
are, "to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States", and "to 
co-ordinate and intensify their collaboration and efforts to achieve a 
better life for the peoples of Africa". To those ends member states are 
requested to "co-ordinate and harmonize their general policies", 
particularly:
(a) Political and diplomatic co-operation;
(b) Economic co-operation, including transport 
and communications;
(c) Educational and cultural co-operation;
(d) Health, sanitation, and nutritional co-operation;
(e) Scientific and technical co-operation; and
(f) Co-operation for defence and security 
(Brownlies Basic Documents on African Affairs p.3).
Given the fact that independent Africa had inherited fragmented, retarded 
and virtually undeveloped economies and, colonial development had been entirely 
geared towards the export-import enclave, it is not surprising that the
O.A.U. Charter adopted such a strong stance on the issue of economic 
integration. At independence there were strong feelings of pan-Africanism 
which faced insurmountable problems. Dominated by huge TNC’s who are 
sometimes economically as large, or larger than the African governments 
themselves, with economic decisions largely influenced from outside, 
implementing economic integration and collective self-reliance was to 
prove a purposeful means only on paper and not in reality. This fact is 
not least due to the collaboration of certain governments with international 
capital, (see Part I).
However, despite the fall of the much heralded East African Community 
efforts to consolidate support for collective action have been on the 
increase in the past decade. The emphasis is on continental co-operation 
in general with regional schemes being the particular emphasis. In the 
Southern African sub-system recent shifts in attitude mark the commence­
ment of the process of redefining regional and extra-regional relations.
An attempt is being made by the Southern African States to look unto them­
selves rather than to foreign sources for new opportunities through which 
to develop and influence their own destiny. In direction and design there 
is much optimism that Southern Africa is achieving more autonomy. The 
most significant and distinct sign of this optimistic mood is the formation 
of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC).
The SADCC '
As the decade of the 1970’s drew to a close, two contradictory but related 
developments occured which were to indicate the emergence of a new framework 
for regional relations in Southern Africa for the 1980’s. It was in 1979 
that South African Prime Minister (as he was then) P.W. Botha announced a 
new strategy aimed at the realisation of the "outward" looking policy pro­
pounded by his predecessors: the forging of a "Constellation of Southern
African States". It was also the year that the Southern African frontline 
states convened the first Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference at Arusha to launch a campaign for "economic liberation" from 
South Africa's regional economic hegemony.
Botha’s scheme for a constellation was set on a course of failure from its 
inception; The plan was to involve the black "independent" homelands of 
South Africa and the independent states of Southern Africa in a regional 
economic union aimed at increased economic integration and political co­
existence - a form of South African Commonwealth with South Africa as head. 
Botha however undermined the feelings of the black states. What they were 
being asked to do is participate in a venture which would permit minority 
white domination in the region with a new twist - black participation.
The frontline states could not be lured by Pretoria's long stressed policy 
of "peaceful co-existence" and "non interference" while at the same time 
it continued its illegal occupation of Namibia, carried out repeated attacks 
on Angola and supported counter-revolutionaries in Mozambique.
The final blow against South Africa’s strategy was struck on April 1, 1980. 
On that date all the independent Southern African States - Angola, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Mozambique , Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi - 
came together at Lusaka to form the SADCC. At this conference was adopted
the Declaration; Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation. This
spells out the broad policies and objectives of SADCC and reads in part:
Southern Africa is dependent on the Republic 
of South Africa as a focus of transport and 
communications, an exporter of goods and
services and as an importer of goods and
cheap labour. This dependence is not a 
natural phenomenon nor is it simply the 
result of a free market economy. The nine 
States and one occupied territory of Southern 
Africa (Namibia) were, in varying degrees, 
deliberately incorporated - by metropolitan 
powers, colonial rulers and sub-colonial 
structures centering in general on the 
Republic of South Africa. The development 
of national economies as balanced units, 
let alone the welfare of the people of 
Southern Africa, played no part in the 
economic integration stretegy. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, Southern Africa 
is fragmented, grossly exploited and sub­
ject to economic manipulation by outsiders.
Future development must aim at the 
reduction of economic dependence not only on 
the Republic of South Africa, but also to 
any single external State or group of 
States.
What is being expressed is a stance on regional relations. The members 
of SADCC are saying they can no longer stand by while South Africa exercises 
its economic will in the region. The declaration sets out the development 
objectives which it is believed will lessen dependency as
1. The reduction of economic dependence, 
particularly, but not only on the 
Republic of South Africa.
2. The forging of links to create a 
regional integration.
3. The mobilisation of resources to promote 
the implementation of national, interstate 
and regional policies.
4. Concerted action to secure international 
co-operation within the framework of the 
strategy for economic liberation.
The key to the achievement of these goals was identified at Lusaka as 
transport and communications. The delegates at the Lusaka Summit saw the 
dominance of South Africa's transport system and their dependence on it as 
paramount in their policy for change and immediately set up the Southern 
Africa Transport and Communications Commission based in Maputo. A Program 
of Action also formally adopted at Lusaka identifies the various areas of 
co-operation and the countries responsible for co-ordinating these areas. 
The areas of co-operation are as follows:
- regional food security (Zimbabwe)
- co-ordinated control of foot and mouth disease in cattle on 
a regional basis (Botswana)
- establishment of a regional sub-centre of the International 
Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics based in 
Botswana and co-ordinated with the hele of India
- regional industrial development (Tanzania)
- formulation of a regional energy conservation policy (Angola)
- sharing of national training facilities and assessment of 
need and opportunities for co-operation in manpower resources 
(Swaziland)
- establishment of a Southern Africa Development Fund (Zambia)
- forestry, fisheries and wildlife (Malawi)
- regional mining development (Zambia)
- soil conservatipn and land utilization (Lesotha and Zambia)*
♦Source: P . Meyrs The Southern African Development Co-Ordination Conference 
p.204 and Nsekela p.l.
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The SADCC is a loosely knit organisation without any central control. At 
Lusaka the emphasis was not on institution building but on sectoral develop­
ment projects seen by the delegates as a priority in terms of the fulfilment 
of SADCC objectives. A small secretariat has been set up in Botswana to 
handle the administrative work of the organization and act as a centre for 
co-ordination. Much of the work is carried out in the relevant government 
administrations responsible for co-ordinating particular projects. SADCC 
members are adverse to the notion of institution building as this cannot be 
a priority in development. Any institution building must serve the purpose
of development. Or in the late Sir Seretse Khama words: "We must begin
with concrete actions which help us to gain experience and define further 
fruitful ways of co-operation. We should not begin by building elaborate 
institutions and interstate bureacracies. Any institutions should be 
instrumental to co-operation or result from it". (Nsekela p.xvii). rphis
common-sense approach is further strengthened by the Sectorial Paper 
presented at the 1979 Arusha Conference which states that:
"Institutions should be designed first in 
terms of what they are supposed to do, 
second in their requirements for staff and
finance and the availability of this staff
and finance and only third in terms of 
internal institution considerations - the 
exact opposite of the normal administrative 
reform approach". (Nsekela p.38)
The Sectorial Paper stresses that institutional requirements with each 
state having a senior official in the relevant ministry or parastal. Their 
work would then be co-ordinated through a small administrative body - the 
secretariat.
At Lusaka there were no illusions about the difficulties that SADCC would 
have to face. The main problem - as we have seen - is South Africa, sir 
Seretse Khama writing in the introduction to the collection of Sectoral 
Papers edited by J. Nsekela states:
"There were no illusions at Lusaka 
that the advances of'the recent past 
are now secure. Still less was there 
any failure to recognise that there 
would be opposition. The drive for 
national and regional development 
through co-ordinated action may be 
seen by some as a threat to their self 
interests. The struggle for economic 
liberation may therefore be bitterly 
contested," (p.xxi.).
This sobering thought has been realised all too clearly in the lifetime of
SADCC. The response of South Africa to SADCC was summarised at the 4th
Annual Conference (Lusaka) in 1984 in the 1982/3 Progress Report which 
states:
South Africa (has) intensified its 
aggression against SADCC states 
by invasion, military occupation, 
support for banditry, economic forms 
of destabilisation. As President 
Masire said at the opening of the
Maputo Summit (1980 V  South Africa is
trying to extract a high price from
Member States for daring to establish
SADCC; for contributing to the
liberation of our brothers in Namibia, 
and for supporting the cause of 
democracy in South Africa1.
(Proceedings of the Annual Conference,
February 1984 p .9).
Despite this and other problems - such as drought and low commodity prices
on the international market - each annual SADCC summit held since Lusaka
has reported progress in most of the areas identified in the Program of
g
Action. For implementation of its projects SADCC depends on financial 
8 '
Progress Reports of SADCC 2, 3, 4 and 5 - Proceedings pub. by SADCC Secre­
tariat, Gaborone, Botswana.
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aid from donor countries. Numerous pledges by invited governments for 
financial support have been secured. The 1981/82 Progress Report names 
the figure of U.S. $664 million ($487 million external, $178 million 
domestic ) as secured to meet 27% of needs - up from 17% committed in 
1980/81. At the time of the 1985 Conference held at Mbabane $1,000 million 
had been committed to specific projects with another $1,250 million still 
under negotiation. The problem of finance has so far not had much of the 
debt repercussions the rest of Africa is experiencing. Though, judging 
from the experience of the Latin American countries, the problem of debt 
will return with full force. At present the debt burden of the SADCC 
members (excl. Mozambique and Angola) stands thus:
Country Total debt IMF share Debt per
 __________________ US $ millions_________US $ millions capita US $
Botswana 530.3 - 589
Lesotho 244.1 4.3 175
Malawi 1073.0 127.0 165
Swaziland 260.4 13.5 372
Tanzania 3356.1 60.2 170
Zambia 4361.7 753.8 727
Zimbabwe 2967.9 259.3 396
Total 12793.5 1218.1
Sources: IMF, World Bank and Bank for
International Settlements, i.e. Produced 
in South Magazine July 1985.
. Notes: total debts include short and long
term debts for 1983; and I.M.F. loans at 
end 1984. Debt per capita is total divided 
by 1982 populations. Published debt data are 
known to substantially underestimate real levels
In 1984, according to estimates by South Magazine, Zambia, with the 
biggest debt of the SADCC countries was already paying to the I.M.F.
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25 per cent of its export earnings and is already behind with its 
repayments. (p .32).
At this stage of SADCC's life it would be very difficult to estimate what 
future success SADCC may achieve, particularly with regard to economic 
independence from South Africa. However the pragmatic approach adopted is 
clearly the most important factor to this success. Despite this, there is 
always the danger of interference from South Africa. Not only does it 
pose a threat militarily but can cause havoc with the economies of the other 
states besides the BLS. The biggest problem is the political and economic 
heterogeneity of the member states. The ideological divide extends across 
the board ranging from hard-line Marxist Angola and Mozambique to capitalist 
Botswana and Malawi. The political contradictions become more manifest and 
concrete when viewing the member states policies towards the apartheid 
regime. The more conservative regimes see the objectives of SADCC as quite 
distinct from their relationship to South Africa. The ability of SADCC 
to provide developmental structures is taken hand in hand with whatever 
economic advantage can be gained from South Africa. Politically, therefore, 
the biggest problem is the lack ofadistinct and unanimous policy toward 
South Africa; the economic problem being a transfer of dependence from 
South Africa to former colonial powers (plus the U.S., E.C. and 
Scandinavia) who have significant political, economic and strategic 
interests which are quite different from those of the SADCC members.
In conclusion it can only be said that given the fact that the dependence 
relations between South Africa and the BLS stem from a long drawn out 
historical progression of white domination, and that to remove these 
relations, given South Africas1 military and economic might, is am awesome 
task, a different approach may be necessatry. The BLS are essentially 
conservative states which do not pose much of a threat to South Africa.
Their membership of SADCC can only benefit any struggle they undertake 
to diminish dependence relations with South Africa. However, whether they 
will undertake to effectively break off these links is doubtful. Eeirlier 
in the year Lesotho was seen by South Africa as becoming too radical and 
effectively blocked all economic trade resulting in a military takeover.
The basic link in the dependence are the South African multinationals who 
provide most of the foreign capital in these countries. These control
industry, both manufacturing and mining. They also control the 
distribution sectors. There seems to be only two possible means 
of effecting change - political homogeneity and/or democracy in South 
Africa. Thus the road chosen by the BLS, both through the international 
fora and through regional efforts, does not promise to be an easy 
one. Efforts at political unity within SADCC have to be made and 
the danger of gaining new forms of dependency through financial loans 
from the West have to be realised and tackled at the grassroots. 
The Customs Union Agreement will no doubt continue to exist for some 
time in its present form. On its own, changes in its major unequal 
clauses will not affect South Africa's homogeneity. The roots of 
inequality lie .in the historical process whose reversal can only 
occur through the intensification of political struggle and greater 
democratic awareness among the role players and their populations. 
The lessons of the failure of rules of international conduct to 
guarantee equality on the political and economic fronts must be read 
for what they are. The history of the coming into statehood of the 
BLS is not that of legal norms but of brutal dissemination of 
populations from the land by outside forces. The results have not 
had as much impact on the decision makers as on the reserve armies 
of the poverty stricken rural work force and the poorer sections 
of the urban workers. Averaging at 90 per cent of the population 
and facing worsening conditions both on the shopfloor and home, it 
is them who must now bear the burden of a brutal and exploitative 
historical process for which they are not responsible. International 
law in its traditional guise does not guarantee their future. The 
more conscientious branch of international law which seeks to include 
the individual as the main focus of an international legal order 
(human rights) is still young and faces almost impossible odds given 
that the perpetrators of violations of stated human rights are the 
decision makers whose interest is in trying to preserve power bases 
and who hope to work economic miracles in a largely hostile 
international economic environment at the expense of those who really 
matter. The efforts of politicians must therefore focus on the reality 
of international relations and adopt policies and strategies which are 
more concerned with development for human beings and not those aimed at 
enhancing their standing as a composite of the international capitalist 
class. SADCC provides a platform for just such policies and strategies 
and only time will tell whether the potential collective political power 
inherent therein will be harnessed and put to the greater benefit of 
those who matter — the people.
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APPENDIX 1
TEXT OF THE 1910 CUSTOMS AGREEMENT
CUSTOMS AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
AND THE TERRITORIES OF BASUTOLAND, SWAZILAND 
AND THE BECHUANALAND PRECTORATE, 1910 
(AS AMENDED BY THE PROTOCOLS OF 1911 AND 1913)
Whereas it has been agreed to terminate from the 30th of June next the 
Customs Union Convention which at present exists between the Cape of 
Good Hope, the Orange River Colony, Natal, the Transvaal and Southern 
Rhodesia and which includes the territories of Basutoland, Swaziland, 
and North-Western Rhodesia dn the Protectorate of Bechuanaland;
And whereas it is desirable that an agreement should be entered into 
between the Government of the Union , of South Africa (hereinafter 
referred to as the Union) and the territories of Basutoland, Swaziland 
and the Bechuanaland Protectorage (hereinafter referred to as the 
territories) under which
(a) the territories shall maintain a tariff similar to that which 
exists in the Union of South Africa;
(b) an equitable share of the duties collected on goods passing 
through the Union to the territories shall be paid to them, and 
vice versa;
(c) there should be a free interchange of South African products 
and manufactures between the Union and the territories;
Now, therefore, His Excellency, the Governor-General of the Union 
and His Excellency the High Commissioner for and on behalf of the 
territories of Basutoland, Swaziland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
have agreed on behalf of their respective Governments upon the 
following articles:-
ARTICLE 1
The Customs Union Tariff, as it at present exists, shall be maintained 
between the contracting parties until altered by legislation enacted 
by the Union or the territories.
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Provided that that portion of the Union known as the Province of 
the Cape of Good Hope shall, notwithstanding anything contained 
herein, be entitled to levy the surtax now existing in spirits,
imported fromabroad and entered for consumption in that Province.
ARTICLE II
There shall be a free interchange of the products and manufactures of 
the Union and the territories with the exception of spiritis and 
beers, the duties of Customs and Excise on which in the territories 
shall be the same as those for the time being in force in the Union.
ARTICLE III
The adjustment of duties which shall include any Customs or Excise 
duty (except andy Customs or Excise duty or Union manufactured 
spirits or Union manufactured beer) and any surtax between the
parties to this Agreement shall no longer depend upon specific
documents and consignments, but shall be determined on the basis 
laid down in section twelve of the Schedule to the South Africa 
Act, 1909, which for reference is herein quoted, provided that
adjustments shall be made quarterly instead of annually.
There shall be paid into the Treasury of the Union all 
duties of Customs levied on dutiable articles imported into 
and consumed in the territories, and there shall be paid out 
of the Treasury annually towards the cost of administration 
of each territory a sum in respect of such duties which 
shall bear to the total Custom revenue of the Union in 
respect of each financial year the same proportion as 
the average amount of the Customs revenue of such terriroty 
for the three completed financial years, last preceding the 
taking effect of this Act bore to the average amount 
of the whole Customs revenue for all the colonies and 
territories included in the Union received during the 
same period.
ARTICLE IV
The territories shall, as far as possible, conform to the laws and 
regulations for the time being in force within the Union in respect 
to refunds, rebates, abatements, suspensions, methylation, 
prohibitions, removals in bond or otherwise, and interpretations 
of the tariff.
-i r\r\
ARTICLE V
Nothing in this Agreement shall in any way prevent the importation 
free of duty into that portion of the Union known as the Transvaal 
Province for consumption therein of the products and manufactures 
of the Province of Mozambique as provided for in the Convention 
between the Government of the Transvaal and the Government of the 
Province of Mozambique, it being understood, however, that the 
Government of the Union will take the necessary steps to prevent 
the removal of any such goods to the territories unless due entry 
and payment of duty, if any, has been made.
ARTICLE VI
This Agreement shall operate from the 1st July next, and the 
provisions thereof shall continue in force until the 30th June, 
1911, and thereinafter for periods of twelve months, provided that any 
party to this Agreement may give not less than three months' notice 
before the 30th of June of any year of its intention to retire 
therefrom as from the 30th of June following such notice, but provided 
further that should the Legislature of the union at any time amend 
the Customs Tariff or take any steps in conflict with the spirit and 
intent of this Agreement, any of the territories shall be at liberty 
to retire therefrom forthwith; and similarly should any of the 
territories amend the Customs Tariff or take any steps in conflict 
with the spirit and intent of this Agreement, the Union shall be 
at liberty to retire therefrom forthwith.
(published as High Commissioner's Notice No. 127 of 1914).
(Source: ETTINGER, S.J., The Economics of the Customs Union between
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and South 
Africa, PH.D. 1974).
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APPENDIX 2
TEXT OF THE 1969 SOUTHERN AFRICAN 
CUSTOMS UNION AGREEMENT (SACUA)
AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
BOTSWANA, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO,
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND TERMINATING THE 
CUSTOMS AGREEMENT OF 1910 AND CONCLUDING A NEW CUSTOMS 
AGREEMENT, TOGETHER WITH A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
RELATING THERETO
Customs Union Agreement Between the Governments of 
Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland_____
The Governments of the Republic of Botswana, the kingdom of Lesotho, 
the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland -
Being desirous of maintaining the free interchange of goods 
between their countries and of applying the same tariffs 
and trade regulations to goods imported from outside the 
common customs area as hereinafter defined;
Recognising that the Customs Agreement concluded on 29th 
June, 101, as amended from time to time, requires modification 
to provide for the continuance of the customs union 
arrangements in the cnaged circumstances on a basis designed 
to ensure the continued economic development of the customs 
union area as a whole, and to ensure in particular that 
these arrangements encourage the development of the less 
advanced members of the customs union and the diversification 
of their ecnomies, and affort to all parties equitable 
benefits arising from trade among themselves and with other 
countries;
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1 
Definitions
In this Agreement, unless inconsistent with the context - "additional 
duties" means duties imposed in terms of Article 6 of this Agreement; 
"Botswana" means the area of the Republic of Botswana;
"Common customs area" means the combined areas of Botswana, Lesotho, 
South Africa and Swaziland;
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"customs duties", "excise duties" and "sales duties" mean customs 
duties, excise duties and sales duties as defined in the customs 
and excise. Legislation in force in the countries of the contracting 
parties;
"financial year" means the period of twelve months commencing on 
the first of April;
"Lesotho" means the area of the Kingdom of Lesotho;
"South Africa" means the area in respect of which the Government 
of the Republic of South Africa is a contracting party to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade;
"Swaziland" means the area of the Kingdom of Swaziland; 
and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.
ARTICLE 2
Interchange of Domestic Products
Except as elsewhere provided herein, a contracting party shall not 
apply quantitative restrictions or impose any duties on goods grown, 
produced or manufactured in the common customs area on importation 
of such goods from the area of any other contracting party.
ARTICLE 3
Interchange of Goods Imported from outside 
The Common Customs Area
Except as elsewhere provided herein a contracting party shall not 
impose any duties on goods which were imported from outside the common 
customs area on importation of such goods from the area of any other 
contracting party.
ARTICLE 4
Customs and Sales Duties on Imported Goods
(1) Except as elsewhere provided herein, the customs tariff and 
duties and the sales duties as in force in South Africa from time to 
time shall be applied to goods imported into the common customs area 
from outside such area.
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(2) Any rebates, refunds or drawbacks of customs duty or sales duty on 
imported goods granted by the Government of Botswana, Lesotho or
Swaziland in respect of such goods for use in or used in any industry 
shall be identical to any such rebates, refunds or drawbacks in force 
in South Africa in respect of such goods for use in or used in a 
corresponding industry in South Africa.
(3) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (4), all other rebates, refunds
or drawbacks of customs duty or sales duty on imported goods granted
by the Government of Botswana, Lesotho, or Swaziland in respect of such 
goods shall be similar to any such rebates, refunds or drawbacks
in force in South Africa.
(4) (h) A contracting party may grant a full rebate of the customs
and sales duties in respect of goods imported into its area:
(i) for the relief of distress of persons in cases of famine 
and other national disaster;
(ii) under any technical assistance agreement; and 
(iii) in terms of an obligation under any multilateral international 
agreement to which such contracting party is or becomes
a party.
(b) A contracting party may, with prior approval of the other
contracting parties, grant a full rebate of the customs and sales
duties in respect of goods imported into its area for such other 
purposes as may be agreed upon by the parties to this Agreement from 
time to time.
ARTICLE 5
Imposition and Amendment of Customs Duties
(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of this Article, 
the Government of South Africa shall give the other contracting parties 
adequate opportunity for consultation before imposing, amending or 
abrogating any customs duty with respect to goods imported into the 
common area from outside such area.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this Article shall not apply if the 
imposition of, or the removal of, or an amendment to any customs 
duty either forms part of the measures of the Governemtn of South Africa 
designed primarily for fiscal purposes, or is resorted to as an interim 
measure designed to assist a local industry in the common customs area 
pending the completion of an investigation by the appropriate South 
African authorities.
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ARTICLE 6
Imposition of Additional Duties for Protective 
Purposes by Botswana, Lesotho or Swaziland
(1) The Government of Botswana, Lesotho or Swaziland may levy 
additional duties on goods imported into its area to enable new 
industries in its area to meet competition from other producers or 
manufacturers in the common customs area, provided that such duties 
are levied equally on goods grown, produced or manufactured in other 
parts of the common customs area and like products imported from 
outside that area, irrespective of whether the latter goods are imported 
directly or from the area of any other party to this Agreement and 
subject to payment of the customs duties applicable to such goods 
on importation into the common customs area.
(2) Before any such duties are imposed or amended the Government 
concerned shall consult the other contracting parties in terms of 
Article 20, and such parties may make recommendations thereon. If 
the recommendations of any such parties are not acted upon, the 
Government concerned shall inform the other contracting parties of 
the reason for its decision.
(3) Protection which is afforded to a new industry in terms of 
this Article shall not be given for a period exceeding eight years 
without the prior consent of the contracting parties.
(4) In this Article, "new industry" in relation to any
contracting party means an industry which has been established in 
the area of that party for not more than eight years.
ARTICLE 7
Specification of Industries of Major Importance 
to Botswana, Lesotho or Swaziland
(1) The Government of Botswana, Lesotho or Swaziland may with
the concurrence of the other contracting parties -
(a) specify industries which are or are likely to be of
major importance to its economy; and
(b) specify periods in relation to such industries for
the purposes of paragraph (2) of this Article.
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(2) The customs duties applicable to goods, imported from outside 
the common customs area and competing with those of any industry 
specified in terms of paragraph (1) (b) above in relation to that
industry be decreased or abrogated without the consent of the Government 
specifying the industry; and during such period the Government of 
South Africa shall with due regard to the interests of the other 
contracting parties and to the criteria usually applied by it in 
the consideration of representations for tariff assistance and relief, 
give sympathetic consideration to proposals by any other contracting 
party to increase any customs duty applicable to such goods or to 
afford relief of customs duty applicable to any material, used directly 
in the production or manufacture thereof and to requriements for 
such industres, where the Government concerned regareds such increase 
or relief necessary to assist the establishment of such industry 
or to prevent its contraction.
ARTICLE 8
Excise and Sales Duties on Goods Produced 
in the Common Customs Area
(1) The excise duties and the sales duties as in force in South 
Africa from time to time shall be applied to goods grown, produced 
or manufactured in the common customs area.
(2) Any rebates, refunds or drawbacks of excise duty or sales duty 
granted by the Government of Botswana, Lesotho or Swaziland in respect 
of goods grown, produced or manufactured in the common customs area, 
for use in or used in any industry shall be identical to any such 
rebates, refunds or drawbacks in force in South Africa in respect 
of such goods for use in or used in a corresponding industry in South 
Africa.
(3) All other rebates, refunds or drawbacks of excise duty 
or sales duty granted by the Government of Botswana, Lesotho or 
Swaziland in respect of goods grown, produced or manufactured in 
the common customs area shall be similar to any such rebates, refunds 
or drawbacks in force in South Africa.
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ARTICLE 9
Duties of Goods Produced by Specified Industries
(1) If goods grown, produced or manufactured in Botswana, Lesotho 
or Swaziland, by an industry specified in pursuance of Article 7 
of this Agreement, are subject to excise duties, the margin of 
protection afforded by the customs duty applicable to such goods 
shall be maintained for the period specified under that Article and 
may be changed only with the agreement of the Government specifying 
the industry.
(2) During the specified period the Government of South Africa 
shall with due regard to the interests of the other contracting parties 
and to the criteria usually applied by it in the consideration of 
representations for tariff assistance and relief, give sympathetic 
consideration to proposals by such a Government to reduce or abrogate 
any excise duty applicable to such goods where such a Government 
regards such duty as injurious to that industry.
ARTICLE 10
Laws Relating to Customs, Excise and Sales Duties
Subject to the provisions of Articles 4 and 8, the Governments of 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland shall apply laws relating to customs, 
excise and sales duty similar to such laws in force in South Africa 
from time to time.
ARTICLE 11
Import and Export Prhobitions and Restrictions
(1) The contracting parties recognise the right of each party 
to prohibit or restrict the importation into or exportation from 
its area of any goods for economic, social, cultural or other reasons.
(2) Except in so far as may be agreed upon between the parties 
from time to time, the provisions of this Agreement shall not be deemed 
to suspend or supersede the provisions of any law within any part 
of the common customs area which prohibits or restricts the importation 
or exportation of goods.
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(3) The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not be so 
construed as to permit the prohibition or restriction of the importation 
by any contracting party into its area of goods grown, produced or 
manufactured in other areas of the common customs area for the purpose 
of protecting its own industries producing such goods.
(4) A contracting party shall upon request by any other contr­
acting party take such steps as may be agreed upon between the parties 
concerned (including action to make such steps legally enforceable 
within its area) to prevent the exportation of unrestricted exportation 
from its area to the area of such other contracting party of such 
prohibited or restricted goods imported from outside the common customs 
area or grown, produced or manufactured in its area or to prevent 
the exportation or unrestricted exportation from its area to a country 
outside the common customs area of such prohibited or restricted 
goods imported from the area of such other contracting party.
(5) The contracting parties shall co-operate in the applciation
of import restrictions with a view to ensuring that the economic 
objectives of any import control legislation in any country in the
common customs area are attained.
ARTICLE 12
Arrangements for Regulating the Marketing 
of Agricultural Products
(1) Whenever an arrangement for regulating the marketing of an
agricultural commodity is in operation in any area of the common 
customs area, such arrangement shall be applied on an equitable basis to 
similar commodities produced in any other area of the common customs 
area and marketed in the area where the marketing arrangement is
in operation, and the contracting parties cocerned, cognisant of 
the advantages deriving from the effective operation of those 
arrangements, shall co-operate in such arrangements on a basis to 
be mutually agreed upon.
(2) The contracting parties agree to consult from time to time 
on matters affecting production and consumption of agricultural 
commodities and the improvement and extension of marketing arrangements, 
for such commodities.
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ARTICLE 13
Pool of Customs, Excise, Sales and Additional Duties
Any customs, excise, sales and additional duties collected in the 
common customs area shall be paid quarterly into the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund of South Africa.
ARTICLE 14
The Pool of Customs, Excise, Sales and Additional Duties
(1) The common revenue pool of the common customs area shall 
consist of the gross amounts of customs, excise, sales and additional 
duties leviable and collected on goods imported into or produced 
in the common customs area, and any other duties collected in terms 
of Article 19 (3), but shall not include any duties rebated or refunded 
under the provisions of any law relating to customs, exicse and sales 
duty (including any rebate or refund specifically provided for in 
any such law but which is paid from voted funds and not deducted 
from customs, excise and sales duty revenue).
(2) The contracting parties agree that in determining the share
of Botswana, Lesotho or Swaziland of the common revenue pool in respect
of any financial year the following formula shall be used:
The cost-insurance-freight value at border of goods from all sources 
imported during the financial year into the area of each party, plus 
the value of excisable and sales duty goods produced and consumed 
in such area during such year, plus the excise and sales duties paid 
thereon during such year shall be expressed as a percentage of the
cost-insurance-freight value of the goods imported during the financial 
year into the common custom area, plus the customs and sales duties 
paid thereon during such year, plus the value of excisable and sales 
duty goods, produced and consumed during such year in the common
customs area, plus the excise and sales duties paid thereon during
such year. The amount calculated by the appliation to the common
revenue pool of the percentage so obtained, enhanced by a multiplying 
factor of 1.42, shall represent the share of each of the three countries 
in respect of that financial year.
(3) There shall be paid from the Consolidated Revenue Fund 
of South Africa to the Government of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, 
in respect of their share of the common revenue pool, amounts calculated 
on the following basis:
(a) in respect of the financial year 1972/73 and each financial 
year thereafter:
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(i) an amount resulting from the application to the formula 
referred to in paragraph (2) above, of the relevant data 
for the financial year two years before the financial 
year in question;
plus or minus
(ii) a first adjustment in respect of the financial year 
two years before the financial year in question equal to 
the difference between the total amount actually received 
by each country in respect of that year and the amount 
due to each country in terms of the formula referred to 
in paragraph (2) above, recalculated on the basis 
of the latest available data for that particular
financial year; •
plus or minus
(iii) a final adjustment in respect of the financial year three 
years before the financial year in question equal 
to the difference between the total amount actually
received by each country in respect of that year and the 
amount due to each country in terms of the formula 
referred to in paragraph (2) above, recalculated on the 
basis of the final data for that particular financial 
year;
(b) in respect of the financial year 1971/72:
(1) an amount resulting from the application to the formula 
referred to in paragraph (2) above of the relevant
data for the financial year 1969/70;
plus or minus
(ii) an amount in respect of the financial year 1969/70 equal 
to the difference between the total amount actually
received by each country in respect of that year and 
the amount due to each country in terms of the formula 
referred to in paragraph (2) above, recalculated on
the basis of the latest available data for the financial
year 1969/70;
(c) in respect of the financial year 1970/71: an amount resulting 
from the application to the formula referred to in paragraph
(2) above, of the relevant data for the financial year 
1968/69 except that in the case of import values 1968 data 
shall be used and that agreed estimates of the values of 
sales duty goods produced and consumed in the financial 
year 1969/70 and the sales duties collected thereon shall 
be included.
(d) in respect of the financial year 1969/70: an amount equal
to the difference between the total amount actually received 
by each country in respect of that year and the amount due to 
each country in terms of the formula referred to in paragraph
(2) above, calculated on the basis of the relevant data for 
the financial year 1968/69, except that in the case of
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import values 1968 data shall be used, and that no imputed 
allowances for the values of sales duty goods produced 
and consumed and the sales duties thereon shall be included.
(4) The amounts referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of
(3) above shall be determined and agreed upon between the contracting 
parties approximately six months before the beginning of the financial 
year in question.
(5) The amounts referred to in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c)
of paragraph (3) above shall be remitted in equal quarterly instalments 
during the financial year in question.
(6) The payment referred to in subparagraph (d) of paragraph (3) 
above shall be made before the end of the financial year 1969/70.
(7) The Government of South Africa undertakes to consult the
Governments of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland prior to the introduction 
of changes in the fiscal structure of South Africa where these are 
expected to have a substantial effect *on the structure of taxation
measures relating to the common revenue pool.
(8) This Article shall be deemed to have come into operation on 
the first day of April, 1969, and to have been substituted from that 
date for the corresponding provisions of the Customs Agreement concluded 
on the 29th June, 1910.
ARTICLE 15
Rail and Road Traffic
(1) The contracting parties undertake that the transit through 
their areas of goods imported from outside the common customs area 
to or exported to a country outside the common customs area from 
the areas of the other contracting parties shall not be subject to 
transport rate discrimination.
(2) Each contracting party shall ensure that the tariffs 
applicable within its area to the conveyance of goods by publicly-owned 
transport to and from the other areas of the common customs area 
shall be no less favourable than the tariffs applicable to the carriage 
of similar goods within its area.
(3) Each contracting party undertakes to extend to the motor 
transport operators registered in the areas of the other contracting 
parties treatment no less favourable than that accorded to motor 
transport operators registered within its own area for the conveyance of 
goods or passengers for reward or in the course of any trade or business.
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ARTICLE 16
Freedom on Transit
A contracting party shall afford freedom of transit without discrimin­
ation to goods consigned to and from the areas of the other contracting 
parties: Provided, however, that a contracting party may impose
such conditions upon such transit as it deems necessary to protect 
its legitimate interests in respect of goods of a kind of which the 
importation into its area is prohibited on grounds of public morals, 
public health or security, or as a precaution against animal or plant 
diseases, parasites and insects, or in pursuance of the provisions of a 
multilateral international convention to which it is a party: And
provided, further, a contracting party shall not be precluded from 
refusing transit, or from taking any measures deemed necessary by 
it in connection with such transit, for the purposes of protecting 
its security interests.
ARTICLE 17
Bilateral Consultations
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 2, if, as a result of 
unforeseen developments, any product is being introduced into the 
area of one of the contracting parties from the area of another 
contracting party in such increased quantities and under such conditions 
as to cause or threaten serious injury to producers or manufacturers 
of like or directly competitive products in the area into which such 
goods are so introduced, the Government of the latter area shall 
have the right to require the other party to consult at the earliest 
possible opportunity and to co-operate with it in finding as soon 
as possible a mutually acceptable solution.
ARTICLE 18
Consultations on Zoo-Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Matters
Subect to the provisions of Article 11, the contracting parties 
recognise the importance of measures prescribing zoo-sanitary and 
phyto-sanitary requirements aimed at the prevention of the spread
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of animal and plant diseases, parasites and insects and agree to 
consult from time to time to achieve such aim in the common customs 
area with due regard to the need to facilitate the flow of trade 
in products affected by such measures.
ARTICLE 19
Trade Agreements with Countries Outside the Common Customs Area
(1) A contracting party shall not, without the prior concurrence 
of the other contracting parties and subject to such conditions as 
may be agreed upon by the contracting parties, enter separately into 
or amend a trade agreement with a country outside the common customs 
area in terms of which concessions on the duties in force in the 
common customs area are granted to that country.
(2) A contracting party may enter separately into or amend 
a trade agreement, other than a trade agreement mentioned in paragraph
(1), with a country outside the common customs area, provided the 
terms of such an agreement or amendment do not conflict in any way
with the provisions of this Agreement. Such contracting party shall,
as soon as possible after the conclusion of the agreement or amendment, 
supply each of the other contracting parties with a copy of the 
agreement or amendment.
(3) (a) A contracting party, having an agreement with a country
outside the common customs area which provides for the importation 
into its area from such country of goods at lower rates of duty than 
those applicable to like goods in the common customs area, shall 
collect the duties payable on importation into its area.
(b) Unless the contracting parties have otherwise agreed 
in respect of any such agreement, where such goods are to be removed
from the area of such contracting party to the area of any of the
other contracting parties the duties applicable in the common customs 
area shall become due and payable and the contracting party from 
whose area such goods are to be removed shall, prior to such removal, 
collect the differences between the lower duties paid and the duties 
applicable. If proof of payment of the differences in duty cannot be 
furnished in the area to which the goods are subsequently removed, 
the goods shall be liable to forfeiture.
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(c) Any duties and differences in duties thus collected shall
be paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund of South Africa. Any 
payments due by that contracting party under such agreement with
a country outside the common customs area, shall be paid on its behalf
from the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
ARTICLE 20
General Consultations
(1) A Customs Union Commission shall be established, comprising 
representatives of all the contracting parties, for the purpose of 
discussing any matter arising out of this Agreement.
(2) The Commission shall meet once a year. A contracting party 
may, however, at any time request a meeting of the Commission for 
the purpose of discussing a matter connected with this Agreement
and the Commission shall meet as soon as possible thereafter.
(3) Where contracting parties have consulted on a matter which 
may affect the rights of the other parties under this Agreement and 
arising under Article 12, 17 or 18 or on a matter arising under
paragraph (5) of this Article, a report on the results of these 
consultations shall be furnished to the Commission before its next
meeting.
(4) Where a matter has been referred to the Commission for 
discussion, the Commission shall use its best endeavours to find
a mutually agreeable solution to the particular problem or difficulty 
and the representatives shall report to their respective Governments 
for consideration of any remedial measures.
(5) Any difficulty or problem arising out of this Agreement which 
does not directly effect the interests of all the contracting parties 
may, with the concurrence of all the contracting parties, form the
subject of direct consultation between the parties affected with 
a view to seeking a solution therof.
ARTICLE 21
Termination of 1910 Agreement
The Customs Agreement concluded on the 29th June 1910, as amended 
from time to time, shall terminate on the entry into force of this
Agreement.
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ARTICLE 22
Entry into Force of, and Withdrawal from, Agreement
This Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article 14 (8)
enter into force on the 1st March, 1970.
If a contracting party wishes to withdraw from this Agreement that 
party shall give notice thereof to all the other contracting parties.
If after consultation the contracting parties fail to agree on the 
date and conditions of the withdrawal, this Agreement shall remain 
in force until twelve months from the date of such notice and shall 
then cease to apply to the withdrawing party.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto 
by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.
Done at Pretoria, in quadruplicate, in Afrikaans and English texts, 
each of which texts shall be of equal authenticity, this eleventh 
day of December, 1969.
For the Government of the Republic of Botswana:
J.G. HASKINS
For the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho:
P.N. PEETE
For the Government of the Republic of South Africa:
J.F.W. HAAK
For the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland:
L. LOVELL
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
With reference to the Customs Union Agreement dated the 11th December 
1969, between the Governments of Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and 
Swaziland, it is desired to place on record the following additional 
understandings on which agreement has been reached among the four 
Governments and which shall be read with, and shall form part of 
the Agreement:
AD ARTICLES 3, 4, 8 AND 10
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Administration of Customs, Excise and Sales Duty Provisions
(1) The Governments of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland undertake 
to establish customs and excise administration capable of administering 
the terms of the Agreement and any arrangements thereunder, customs
and excise storage and manufacturing warehouse provisions, excise
provisions and the collection of excise duties and sales duty provisions 
and the collection of sales duties.
(2) The contracting parties agree that:
(a) goods (including goods for warehousing) destined for 
Botswana, Lesotho or Swaziland and imported through any 
place of entry in South Africa (including Lourenco
Marques and Jan Smuts Airport) shall be entered for 
customs, excise or sales duty purposes through South 
African customs and for that purpose the laws relating 
to customs, excise and sales duty of South Africa
will apply to such goods as if such goods were destined 
for South Africa: Provided that if the laws relating
to customs, excise and sales duty of Botswana, Lesotho
or Swaziland as the case may be, should, in relation to 
such goods, differ in respect of any restriction,
prohibition, tariff or rebate under the Agreement,
the relative law of the country of destination of 
such goods shall in that respect be deemed to be the law 
relating to customs, excise or sales duty, as the
case may be, of South Africa in relation to such goods;
(b) goods destined for South Africa and imported other than 
by road through any place in Botswana, Lesotho or 
Swaziland shall be entered for customs, excise or 
sales duty purposes at the place of entry in South
Africa. Goods so destined and imported by road shall be 
so entered at the placeo f entry into the common customs 
area;
(c) goods destined for Botswana, Lesotho or Swaziland 
and imported directly into the country in question shall, 
subject to the provisions of subparagraph (a), be 
entered for customs, excise or sales duty purposes
in that country;
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(d) goods for warehousing in any customs and excise storage 
warehouse established in the area of Botswana, Lesotho 
or Swaziland shall be cleared for warehousing at places 
of entry in South Africa for removal to such warehouse 
without further entry, but any clearance ex such 
warehouse of such goods and collection of any customs, 
excise or sales duty thereon shall be the responsibility 
of the country in whose area the warehouse is situated;
(e) the administration of any customs and excise manufac­
turing warehouse (including the collection of any 
customs, excise or sales duty on the goods manufactured 
in such warehouses) in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland 
shall be the responsibility of the country in whose 
area the warehouse is situated;
(f) provisions relating to drawbacks of duty on goods 
used in the manufacture of exported goods shall be 
administered by the Government in whose area the exporter 
is situated, but the Government of South Africa shall 
accept responsibility for the processing of claims 
for drawback of any duty emanating from exporters 
in Botswana, Lesotho or Swaziland in respect of goods 
exported from the common customs area and payment 
of such claims shall be effected from the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund of South Africa.
Done at Pretoria, in quadruplicate, in Afrikaans and English texts, each 
of which texts shall be of equal authenticity, this eleventh day of 
December, 1969.
For the Government of the Republic of Botswana:
J.G. HASKINS
For the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho:
P.N. PEETE
For the Government of the Republic of South Africa:
J.F.W. HAAK
For the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland:
(Source: ETTINGER, S.J., The Economics of the Customs Union between
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and South 
Africa, PH.D. 1974)
and
L. LOVELL
